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ABSTRACT 
 
Title of dissertation:   Application of HFACS Tool for Analysis of Investigation 
Reports of Accidents Involving Containerized Dangerous 
Cargoes 
 
Degree:                         MSc 
 
The dissertation is a study of applying HFACS tool into analyzing investigation 
reports of accidents involving containerized dangerous cargoes, with the purpose of 
examining the human and organizational factors within this context.  
 
Twelve investigation reports of accidents involving containerized dangerous cargoes 
were retrieved from different international sources. The HFACS framework and 
taxonomy were chosen to analyze and classify the human factors contained in the 
collected investigation reports. By examining the results of it, the utility of HFACS 
tool in this domain was tested and ultimately proved to be positively useful. There 
are no meaningful statistical trends revealed in the result, especially those associated 
with the shipper, even though it was proved in this research that the shipper’s factors 
had made an important contribution to the accidents involving containerized 
dangerous cargoes. Additionally, shipper’s “barrier” functions in the container 
shipping safety system were examined with the use of barrier classification concept. 
The limitation of the research was discussed in the last chapter with the hope of 
inspiring future research.  
 
KEYWORDS: Accident Investigation, Human Factor, HFACS, Containership, 
Dangerous Goods, Shipper 
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Chapter 1 Introduction, Purpose and Scope 
 
1.1 Introduction to Maritime Transportation of Containerized 
Dangerous Cargoes from a safety point of view 
 
Maritime transportation can be regarded as a separate transportation system, 
compared to air, rail and road transportation systems from a safety point of view, 
even though it closely interacts with other kinds of transportation systems. Take the 
maritime transportation of containerized dangerous cargo as an example. To control 
the hazards from amounts of packaged dangerous goods in a container, the whole 
transportation process from the shore-based process, like packing, marking, labeling, 
placarding declaration, to ship-based process, like loading, unloading, stowage, 
segregation, securing, sea-transport, has been addressed and harmonized by a set of 
international regulations as follows.  
 
The United Nation’s Economic Commission has developed a Globally Harmonized 
System of Classification and Labeling of Chemicals (GHS) concerning the 
classification of dangerous goods by the types of hazards they pose in order to 
improve the protection of human safety, health and the environment, and facilitate 
the trade and transport of chemicals on the basis of harmonization of the regulations 
on chemicals at various levels – national, regional and worldwide.(Hollnagel, 2008) 
 
To regulate dangerous cargo transportation within the maritime sector under the 
umbrella of GHS, International Maritime Organization (IMO) has developed the 
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chapter-VII of International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as 
amended (SOLAS 74) and annex-III of International Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 73/78) 
with which the International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code is 
incorporated to provide detailed compliance standards covering each relevant process 
mentioned above.  
 
Domestically, contracting governments are obliged to implement the above 
international requirements into the national domain.  
 
It is necessary to clarify here the definition of containerized dangerous cargo 
(referred to CDG hereinafter) which is relevant to the scope of this research. It means 
the packaged form of dangerous cargo transported within a freight container. 
Obviously, this definition combines the meaning of two definitions from IMO 
conventions, the definition of packaged dangerous cargo and the freight container, 
which are separately stipulated in IMDG Code.  
 
1.2 Safety Concerns of Containerized Dangerous Cargo 
Transportation at Sea 
 
One of the major changes which has emerged from the globalization of trade has 
seen the tonnage of IMDG cargo soar, so that the amount of hazardous cargo on 
board a single post-panamax vessel on a voyage from the Far East to Europe could 
amount to 10,000 tones and upwards (Mullai Arben & Larsson Everth, 2008). 
Generally, it is estimated that between 10% to 15% of the cargoes transported in 
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packaged form are dangerous or hazardous from a safety point of view (IMO, 2006). 
 
As an intermodal freight container is sealed when loaded, its contents are not visible unless 
the container is inspected. IMO has carried out container inspection programme since 
1996 among its member States. The consolidated results of 1996-2001 inspection 
revealed that the deficiency rate amounted to 30% (IMO, 2002). Even after 13 years 
until 2008, the deficiency rate still disappointedly amounted to 18% (IMO, 2008a). 
 
There is some research trying to analyze the risks of CDG transported by sea from 
different points of view. Ellis and Lumsden (2009) have carried out the investigation 
on risk associated with the marine transport of undeclared dangerous goods, and 
found that: “there is the potential for serious incidents to occur. If undeclared 
dangerous goods are released during transport, consequences can be as severe as loss 
of life, extensive cargo losses, and vessel damages (Ellis Joanne & Lumsden Kent, 
2009).” Günter Wichmann (2006) from Munich Re Group pointed out: “The safe 
transportation of dangerous goods is one of the greatest challenges in container 
shipping. Even if fires on container ships are much less common than other types of 
loss in the marine sector, the damage is usually immense (Günter Wichmann, 2006).” 
EMSA (2008) expressed its concern on expensive insurance claims resulting from 
containership accidents, and explained the reason: “ton for ton,‘box ships’carry the 
cargoes with the highest value of any category of cargo ship, and they are also 
rapidly increasing in size. Indeed, some individual containers carry millions of Euros 
worth of goods each (European Maritime Safety Agency, 2008).” 
 
The past half century has seen lots of maritime accidents involving CDG, some 
resulting in serious losses, such as the “Sealand Mariner” accident in 1998 causing 
two fatalities, the “Sea Elegance” accident in 2003 causing one fatality, and the 
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“Hyundai Fortune” accident in 2006 causing US$ 300M insurance claims.  
 
Fire/explosion casualties in container cargo spaces have been increasing in the recent 
years (IMO, 2007). Most of these accidents involved containerized dangerous 
cargoes. This trend of fire/explosion in container cargo spaces has also been proved 
by the analysis result of data from Lloyd’s MIU casualty database combined with the 
data retrieved from English publications from maritime accident investigation 
website of different countries (see figure 1). In the past 20 years, there have been 55 
fire/explosion accidents emanated from container cargoes on board containerships 
(see appendix 1). 
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Figure 1 -Container fire/explosion accidents on board containerships in 1990-2009 
Source: retrieved from the Lloyd’s MIU casualty database and English publications from maritime 
accident investigation website of different countries 
 
 
 
 
 4
1.3 Importance of Investigating and Analyzing Human and 
Organizational Factors of Maritime Accidents Involving CDG  
 
The industry would benefit more had the day-to-day generated data be analyzed 
rather than waiting for an accident to happen (Schroder, 2004). Accident 
investigation is one of the tools for improving controls over hazards in the working 
environment (Energy Institute, 2008). In the case of a marine event, packaged 
dangerous goods may be involved and release their hazards by exposing one or a 
combination of the risk receptors, and consequently cause the accident. Accident 
investigation and analysis could help us to search below the surface to catch up the 
contributing causes/latent conditions, in particular those associated with human and 
organizational factors, which could be prevented later on. 
 
Latent conditions are system deficiencies that lead to poor competence, procedures 
and equipment. They hide away from the “sharp end” with which they can always 
link themselves. To prevent further accidents, it is important to understand these 
systems and identify the deficiencies locating inside to develop the solutions. Human 
errors occur because the systems for preventing them have failed in some way. An 
incident, then, is not a person failure but a system failure. Thus in this sense, an 
organization’s safety management system can be thought of as the organization’s 
integrated set of processes that support human performance (Energy Institute, 2008). 
 
Human errors make a significant contribution to maritime accidents according to a 
wide range of sources of research. Baker and McCafferty (2004) revealed that: 
“approximately 50% of maritime accidents are initiated by human error, while 
another 30% of maritime accidents occur due to failures of humans to avoid an 
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accident. In other words, in 30% of maritime accidents, conditions that should have 
been adequately countered by humans were not (Baker & McCafferty, 2004).” 
Reason (1997) also expressed his concern with the human and organizational 
contribution to systems accidents, because accident analyses reveal that these factors 
dominate the risks to complex installations. “Even what appear at first sight to be 
simple equipment breakdowns can usually be traced to some prior human failure. 
Major accidents arise from the unforeseen interactions of human and organizational 
factors (Reason, 1997).” 
 
1.4 Purpose and Scope 
 
The principles can be assembled by combining the knowledge obtained from case 
studies with a more adequate theory (or theories) of error production, and applied to 
the design and operation of high-risk technological systems to reduce either the 
occurrence of errors or their damaging consequences (Reason, 1990). 
 
As the importance of human and organizational factors in terms of contribution to 
maritime accidents, the author has decided to investigate them through the 
application of a specific analysis tool for the analysis of investigation reports of 
maritime accidents involving CDG, with the purpose of revealing any meaningful 
trends in the types of human and organizational errors associated.  
 
The author has chosen the adapted Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System (HFACS) for ship’s machinery space fires and explosions by Ghirxi and his 
corresponding adapted taxonomy as the analytical tool(see appendix 3). The rationale 
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for this choice will be explained further in the next section.  
 
The specific objectives for this research are twofold: one is to examine the utility of 
Ghirxi’s adapted HFACS framework and taxonomy in recognizing and analyzing the 
human factors contained in the investigation reports of maritime accidents involving 
containerized dangerous cargo; the other is to examine the thoroughness of the 
relevant accident investigation reports, with purpose of determining any meaningful 
trends and useful findings in the types of human factors, especially those associated 
with the shipper, after the adoption of “Guidelines for the investigation of human 
factors in marine casualties and incidents” by Resolution A.884(21)(IMO, 2000) . 
 
To fulfill the above objectives, I will try to find as many investigation reports 
associated with the CDG cargo accident by approaching variable international 
databases, especially those accidents happened after 2000 year. After retrieving 
enough data (investigation reports), detailed analysis will be carried out on these 
reports with the use of adopted HFACS tool to find out the contained human factors. 
The retrieved human factors will be analyzed and coded against adapted Ghirxi`s 
taxonomy with the hope of releasing some useful findings. The last two chapters 
(chapter 4 & 5) will further discuss the findings and the limitation of the research. 
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Chapter 2 Methodology and Data Resources 
 
2.1 Introduction to Ghirxi’s adapted HFACS framework and 
taxonomy 
 
The Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) was originally 
developed by the US Department of Defense to investigate aviation mishaps. Later it 
was expanded to be seamlessly applied across all services, and is used to investigate 
aviation, ground, weapons, afloat, space and off-duty mishaps and events (Shappell 
& Wiegmann, 2000). A corresponding comprehensive and open taxonomy was 
created to fulfill this achievement. 
 
The value of the HFACS framework is that it can provide a systematic view of the 
whole system. A system is a network of many variables in causal relationships to one 
another. Thus, it is usually wise when correcting a deficiency to consider it within the 
context of its system. Otherwise, we may treat only the symptoms and not the source 
of the trouble. We may also overlook the unpleasant side effects of our actions and 
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do more harm than good in the long run (Doerner Dietrich, 1996). The HFACS 
framework can force the analyzer or investigator to go back from the front line, 
through the whole system, to the organizational level, which always embody the root 
causes. 
 
However the HFACS framework only provides most of the possible human factors in 
general categories. A more detailed taxonomy is required for further analysis and 
classification in a specific domain. A taxonomy is usually made for a specific 
purpose, and no single scheme is likely to satisfy all needs (Reason, 1990). Thus, the 
original HFACS framework and its corresponding taxonomy were adapted by Ghirxi 
for a case-base analysis of a number of accident investigation reports into ship 
machinery space fires and explosions, considering that the original framework did 
not take into account the maritime transportation sector. (Ghirxi, 2008).  
 
The HFACS framework shares the same theoretical basis, Reason’s model, with the 
IMO`s Code for the investigation of maritime accidents (IMO, 2000). The choice of 
HFACS as the analytical tool can ensure the compatibility of analysis with the 
information contained in the investigation reports.  
 
The adapted HFACS framework and taxonomy by Ghirxi (Ghirxi, 2008) is used as 
the basic analysis tool. There was a need for some slight modifications to be made to 
fit into this research domain. These modifications will be discussed in the next 
chapter. The literature review has not shown any other taxonomy developed on the 
basis of HFACS framework in the maritime sector.  
 
Since the purpose of this research is not to study the theoretical background of the 
HFACS framework, details about the HFACS framework and taxonomy adapted by 
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Ghirxi will not be discussed in this paper. Rather, only those necessary topics related 
to the later analysis and discussion (chapter 4 & 5) will be introduced in this part. 
 
The HFACS framework as adapted expands Reason’s four levels into thirteen 
causal categories as shown in table 1. 
Table 1- The HFACS Framework as adapted for CDG accidents 
First Tier Second Tier Third Tier 
Resources ? Human Resources 
? Technological environment 
? Equipment/facility resources 
 
Latent 
conditions 
Organizational  
climate 
? Structure 
? Policies 
? Culture 
 
Remote 
from 
the ship
 Organizational Process ? Operations 
? Procedures 
? Checks & balances 
 
 
Organizational 
influences 
Statutory ? International standards 
? Flag state implementation 
 
 Inadequate supervision ? Shipborne and shore 
supervision 
 
 Planned inappropriate 
operations 
? Shipborne operations  
 Failed to correct 
known problems 
? Shipborne related 
shortcomings 
 
 
Unsafe 
supervision/ 
workplace 
factors 
Supervisory violations ? Shipborne violations  
 ? Physical  
 
Environmental 
? Technological  
 Crew ? Cognitive factors 
? Physiological state 
 
 
Preconditions 
for unsafe acts 
Personnel ? Crew resource management 
? Personal readiness 
 
Error ? Skill-based 
? Decision 
? Perceptual 
 
Active 
failures Unsafe acts 
Violation ? Routine 
? exceptional 
 
Front 
line 
Macro-perspective                                           Micro-perspective 
Source: Kevin T. Ghirxi. (2008). Application of scientific tools for the analysis of accident 
investigation reports about engine room fires. Unpublished WMU, Malmo, Sweden.  
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Unsafe acts are defined as active actions leading to an error or an unsafe situation. 
Reason emphasizes that unsafe acts should happen in temporal and spatial 
proximities of a hazard (Reason, 1990), while in the accident cases relating to CDG, 
the unsafe act of the operator is usually quite far from the hazard, or to say the hazard 
has been existing for quite some time. A typical example is the mistaken stowage of 
dangerous cargo by the stowage planner. Thus, in the context of CDG accidents, the 
operators of unsafe acts are not limited to crew on board the vessel, but also could 
include the front line individuals working on shore as long as they have made the 
active failures leading to the accident. 
 
It is important to identify unsafe acts as the first step, so that from where the 
investigator could trace backwards until to the highest management level. However 
sometimes the investigator should be aware that there could be several unsafe acts 
acted by different operators leading to one accident. These operators may locate in 
different departments belonging to the same management level, the front line, within 
the analyzed organization. Taking the “Sealand Elegance” accident for example, the 
chemical dangerous cargo, Calcium Hypochlorite, was mistakenly stowed near the 
heat resulting in emanating flammable gas. The flammable gas contained in the cargo 
hold later became ignited by the welding slag falling from the hot working by the 
ignorant maintenance crew, finally leading to the fire/explosion accident. In this case, 
both the wrong stowage by the stowage planner of the shipping company and the 
mistaken welding work by the ignorant maintenance crew are regarded as unsafe 
acts.  
 
Unsafe acts, in the HFACS framework, are categorized into two groups: errors and 
violations, according to whether individuals make them intentionally or 
unintentionally (See figure 2). However this does not mean that errors are either 
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intended or unintended because individuals do not set out to make an error. Rather it 
is the act or the underlying decision process that are intentional or unintentional.  
 
Unsafe acts 
Errors  Violations  
Skill-based  
Decision-based  
Perceptual  
Routine  
Exceptional  Attention failures 
Memory 
Technique  
Procedural decision 
Choice decision 
Problem solving  
Figure 2 - Unsafe acts categorization  
Source: Kevin T. Ghirxi. (2008). Application of scientific tools for the analysis of accident 
investigation reports about engine room fires. Unpublished WMU, Malmo, Sweden.  
The Preconditions for unsafe acts are defined as factors in a mishap if active and/or 
latent preconditions such as conditions of the operators, environmental or personnel 
factors affect practices, conditions or actions of individuals and result in human error 
or an unsafe situation (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). Two areas of factors are 
considered in this level, the individual and the environmental factors. The individual 
factors cover not only physical condition but also the interaction of human. The 
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environmental factors have a wide range covering the physical and the technological 
environmental factors. Barrier systems are usually categorized in this level as the 
technological environmental group. For example, the information of CDG should be 
declared on the document by the shipper (the requirement of declaration is regarded 
as incorporeal barrier function). If the shipper fails to implement the declaration 
requirements, the missing technical information of CDG, regarded as the 
precondition factors for the stowage plan, will probably cause the wrong stowage 
leading to the accident.  
 
The precondition factors are categorized into three groups: environmental factors, 
crew condition, and personnel factors (see figure 3). Environmental factors can be 
subcategorized as physical environment and technological environment groups. Crew 
conditions can be subcategorized as cognitive factors and physiological state groups. 
Personnel factors can be subcategorized as crew interaction and personal readiness 
groups.  
 
Precondition for unsafe acts
Environmental  Condition of crew member 
Physical  
Technological 
Congnitive factors
Physiological state
Personnel  
Crew interaction
Personal readiness
Figure 3 - Categorization of precondition for unsafe acts  
Source: Kevin T. Ghirxi. (2008). Application of scientific tools for the analysis of accident 
investigation reports about engine room fires. Unpublished WMU, Malmo, Sweden.  
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Unsafe supervision factors are defined as factors in a mishap if the methods, 
decisions or policies of the supervisory chain of command (officers at management 
level over operational and support level) directly affect practices, conditions, or 
actions of individual and result in human error or an unsafe situation (Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2000).  
 
Four groups are categorized under the unsafe supervision level: inadequate 
supervision, planned inappropriate operations, failed to correct known problems, and 
supervisory violations (see figure 4)  
 
 
Unsafe 
supervision 
Inadequate 
supervision 
Planned 
inappropriate 
operations 
Failure to correct 
known problems
Supervisory 
violations 
 
Shipborne and 
shore supervision 
Shipborne 
operations 
Shipborne 
related 
shortcomings 
Shipborne 
violations 
Figure 4 - Categorization of unsafe supervision factors  
Source: Kevin T. Ghirxi. (2008). Application of scientific tools for the analysis of accident 
investigation reports about engine room fires. Unpublished WMU, Malmo, Sweden.  
 
Organizational factors are factors in a mishap if the communications, actions 
omissions or policies of upper-level management directly or indirectly affect 
supervisory practices, conditions or actions of the crew member(s) and result in 
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system failure, human error or an unsafe situation (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000).  
 
Four groups are categorized under the organizational level: resource management, 
organizational climate, organizational process and statutory. Resource management is 
subcategorized as human resources, technological resources, and equipment/facility 
resource groups. The organizational climate is subcategorized as operations, 
procedures, and oversight groups. The organizational climate is subcategorized as 
structure, policies, and culture; Statutory, as the new added category by Ghirxi, is 
subcategorized as international/national standards, and flag state implementation.  
 
 
Organizational influences 
Resource 
management
Organizational 
climate 
Organizational
process 
Statutory 
Human  
resources 
Technological  
environment 
Equipment/ 
facility 
structure 
policies 
culture 
operations 
procedures 
oversight 
International/
National 
Flag state 
implementation
Figure 5 - Organizational influences categorization  
Source: Kevin T. Ghirxi. (2008). Application of scientific tools for the analysis of accident 
investigation reports about engine room fires. Unpublished WMU, Malmo, Sweden.  
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2.2 Retrieving and Coding of Human Contributing Factors into 
Adapted HFACS Taxonomy 
 
In order to indentify the human factors contained in the investigation reports and 
classify them into the right plane of the HFACS framework, it is important to 
understand the relationship between different factors. As the HFACS framework does 
not provide tools for identifying this relationship or failed path, other helpful tools 
should be adopted for this research.  
 
Figure 6 shows that an event involves hazards coming into damaging contact with 
targets (people, assets, environment) as the result of a defensive failure. If starting 
with the end result, the analyst is capable of tracing backwards to determine the 
nature of the failed defence(s) and the hazard (Reason, 1997).  
 17
 
Figure 6 - Reason’s human factor model  
Source: Reason, J. (1997). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
For this research, the author chose the barrier analysis combined with time-lines as 
the description tool. The concept of barrier provides one of the few opportunities to 
model interactions and complexity in high risk domains (Reason, 2006). Due to their 
nature, barriers must always be seen in relation to a potential flow of mass, energy, 
and information or control. It is therefore natural to base barrier analysis on a 
representation of possible sequences of functions or successions of events such as 
time-lines or tree diagrams (Hollnagel, 2004).  
 
It is important to point out that the contents to be analyzed are all from the analysis 
part of the investigation reports. From that part of each report, the mentioned 
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contributing factors are retrieved and analyzed in this research paper. This approach 
avoided the “re-investigation” of the accident, which would have otherwise led to 
subjective interpretations (Ghirxi, 2008). 
 
After finishing the analysis and description of all the accidents, all of the found 
human factors are coded manually by the author against the Ghirxi`s adapted 
taxonomy (see appendix 3). If one factor can not be fitted into any nanocode, then 
consideration should be given to create a new one. Totally there are two new 
nanocodes created to suit this research. They are explained in the analysis chapter.  
 
Much time and great attention were paid to verifying the final coding results and the 
adapted modifications to be consistent with the original HFACS framework and 
taxonomy.  
 
2.3 Data 
 
A comprehensive international review of the investigation reports of accidents 
involving CDG has been carried out on the web-base. The IMO Global Integrated 
Shipping Information System (GISIS), IMO`s DSC sub-committee section of IMO 
document website, the casualty database of Lloyd’s MIU, English publications from 
maritime accident investigation website of different countries were examined to 
retrieve qualified investigation reports. Two Chinese investigation reports were 
obtained through the China Maritime Safety Administration. The sources of the 
retrieved investigation reports are illustrated in appendix 2 respectively.  
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Only investigation reports investigating ships falling under SOLAS 1974 were 
retrieved to ensure compliance with the IMDG Code and other international 
regulation. This can also ensure that the master and the crews being investigated 
show the minimum quality standard as required by the International Convention on 
Standard of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers,1978, as 
amended in 1995(STCW 1978). 
 
There is one exceptional case, Wing On No.1, 1999, which is a local ship in Hong 
Kong. This case is included in this analysis data because of two reasons. One is that 
it shows a valuable lesson to the world with regard to the transportation of fuelled 
used motor vehicles/cycles and related spare parts. The other is that after this 
accident, the Hong Kong government carried out an investigation on the local 
regulatory scheme concerning this issue. This report, which could be regarded as the 
supplement to the casualty investigation report, gives us valuable information with 
regard to human factor analysis.    
 
Finally, 12 investigation reports have been collected. Of these, 7 are attributed or 
partly attributed to human causes. The remaining 5 are of unknown origin causes (see 
table 2).  
Table 2- Accidents Involving Containerized Dangerous Cargoes 
Ship name Type/country year Accident type 
Main 
Contributing 
Factors 
MOR UK Containership/Cyprus 1995 DG leakage Unknown 
SEALAND 
MARINER 
Containership/ 
 Marshall Islands 
1998
Explosion, 
two fatalities 
Shipper’s 
Misdeclaration
WONG ON 
NO.1 
Container lighter/HK 1999
Explosion, 
one fatality 
Shipper’s 
Undeclaration 
KITANO Containership/Japan 2001 fire Unknown 
DUTCH 
NAVIGATOR 
Container feeder/ 
Netherlands 
2001
Shift of containers 
/ DG leakage 
Multiple 
SEA 
ELEGANCE 
Containership/Singapore 2003 Fire, one fatality 
Shipper’s 
Undeclaration 
LT UTILE Containership/Panama 2003 Fire Unknown 
CSAV ITAJAI Containership/Marshal 2004 Fire Wrong stowage
PUNJAB 
SENATOR 
Containership/Germany 2005 Fire, explosion Wrong stowage
KOTA 
PAHLAWAN 
Containership/Liberia 2006 DG leakage 
Shipper’s 
Wrong package
CMA CGM 
FIDELTO 
Containership/France 2007
Explosion/ 
DG leakage 
Unknown 
HANJIN 
LONDON 
Containership/ 
South Korea 
2007 DG leakage Unknown 
Total number: 12 cases 
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    Chapter 3 Findings of the Accident Investigation 
Reports Analysis 
The human and organizational factors retrieved from the accident reports were coded 
against Ghirxi’s taxonomy (see appendix 3). Some slight modifications have been 
adapted to suit the research domain and will be explained in this section.  
 
3.1 Identification of Contributing Factors  
 
Totally 32 contributing factors were retrieved from 7 reports with the use of the 
modified HFACS framework. No contributing factor was found in the other 5 reports 
due to the insufficient investigation (the coding result is illustrated in Table 3). 
 22
Table 3- Classified Contributing Factors Against Ghirxi’s Taxonomy 
 Sealand 
Mariner 
Wing 
On 
No.1 
Dutch 
Navigator
Sea 
Elegance
Csav 
Itajai 
Punjab 
Senator 
Kota 
Pahlawan
Total  32 6 4 5 4 5 7 1 
Unsafe acts 8        
AE 103 7 1 1 2 1 1 1  
AE 201 1 1       
Preconditions 4        
PE 202 1     1   
PE 205 2 1   1    
PE 214 1      1  
Supervision 13        
SI 001 5 1  2  1 1  
SI 004 1 1       
SI 007 7 1 1 1 1 1 2  
Organizational  7        
OR 003 1  1      
OR 205 1      1  
FS 001 5  1  1 1 1 1 
The other 5 cases, Mor UK, Kitano, LT Utile, CMA CGM Fidelto, Hanjin London are not 
attributable.  
Remark: Detailed coding results are illustrated in appendix 2.  
 
Among these factors, the supervision factors take the largest number compared to 
others. On the contrary, the precondition factors amount to the lowest number group.  
 
There are also 7 other contributing factors identified, but hard to be categorized into 
any category of Ghirxi’s taxonomy (see table 4). For example, in the “Sea Elegance” 
case, the undeclaration of CDG by the shipper has contributed to the accident, but 
there is no enough information contained in the investigation report addressing the 
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relationship between the shipper and the shipping company. It is still not clear how 
and where this shipper’s failure has influenced the individual and organization 
behavior of the shipping company.  
 
Table 4- Summary of the uncoded contributing factors 
Ship name/actor Contributing factors 
Mor U.K./ 
shipper 
The suspect tank containing between 20 and 80 percent of 
its capacity, which should not be offered for transport by 
ship, resulted in a liquid surge and increased the vertical 
loads at one end. 
SEALAND MARINER/ 
Shipper 
Failure to properly declare and document the hazard class 
on the shipping papers presented to the vessel’s agent. 
SEALAND MARINER/ 
Shipper 
Failure to mark and placard the container. 
SEALAND MARINER/ 
Shipper 
Failure to pack the cargo in accordance with the IMDG 
Code requirements.  
SEA ELEGANCE/ 
Shipper 
Failure to declare the dangerous goods 
KOTA PAHLAWAN/ 
Shipper 
The xanthates carried by “KOTA PAHLAWAN” were not 
hermetically sealed strictly by the shipper in accordance 
with the IMDG Code. 
DUTCH NAVIGATOR/ 
Maintenance company 
The framework and the liner integrity of the tank container 
were impaired due to the improper repair by the 
maintenance organization, contributing to the collapse of 
the framework and the leakage of the content. 
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3.2 Identification of Unsafe Acts 
 
There are only 8 unsafe acts identified from 6 of total 12 accidents. The identification 
percentage is 50%. This shows that only half of the investigations can conclude with 
direct failure. 
 
Seven of  8 unsafe acts are fitted into AE 103, failure to see or avoid. Among these 
7 factors, 5 are associated with the stowage planner of the company who failed to 
scrutinize the undeclared dangerous cargo, or stow the dangerous cargo correctly, 
leading to an unsafe situation. Two are associated with the chief mate failing to stow 
the dangerous goods correctly.  
 
3.3 Identification of Precondition Factors 
 
There are only 4 preconditions identified. There is a very little identification rate 
compared to other category’s, but this does not mean that precondition is not 
important in terms of contribution to the whole event. For instance, the cargo 
information in the vicinity of the location where a fire accident happens is the 
precondition for the firefighting activity to mitigate the consequence. This 
information is vitally important for the fire fighter to be able to decide which fire 
extinguishing strategy, such as water or carbon dioxide, should be adopted to fight 
against the fire (to mitigate the consequence of the fire accident) in the cargo hold.  
 
This can explain the insufficient investigation of some reports where only unsafe acts 
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were identified, but not the precondition factors. Finally, the investigator failed to 
trace back the events from the unsafe acts, and lost valuable information at the 
precondition level.  
 
The nanocode of PE 214, machinery space system knowledge, was adapted as 
illustrated in the following to suit the research domain: 
 
PE 214 CARGO HOLD/MACHINERY SPACE SYSTEM KNOWLEDGE 
A factor when the individual has no adequate or suitable knowledge of the cargo hold 
or the machinery space schematics and line/electrical installations. 
 
3.4 Identification of Supervision Factors 
 
Thirteen supervision level factors were identified and all fell into 2 groups. Five 
factors are categorized as SI 001, leadership/supervision/oversight inadequate, 
associating with failure to oversee the wrong stowage carried out by the stowage 
planner. Another 7 factors are fitted into SI 007, failure to provide current 
public/adequate technical information or procedure, associating with failure to 
provide adequate technical information related to the designated task, like cargo 
information in the vicinity of hot work, cargo information inside the container to be 
shifted, cargo hold information related to the cargo stowage operation.  
 
To suit this research domain, the nanocode SI 007, failure to provide current 
public/adequate technical data or procedures, has been slightly modified as illustrated 
in the following: 
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SI 007 FAILED TO PROVIDE CURRENT PUBLIC/ADEQUATE TECHNICAL 
DATA OR PROCEDURES 
 
A factor when current technical information related to the cargo to be operated, or the 
running of the machinery space, or maintenance of machinery in the machinery space 
is not provided to other crew members at management level and/or at operational and 
support level leading to a dangerous error in judgment/decision. 
 
3.5 Identification of Organizational Factors 
 
Seven organizational factors were identified in 5 of total 12 accidents. Five were 
categorized as FS 001, rule-making process, associating with failure to anticipate the 
potential risks involved, resulting in a loop-hole/weakness in the international 
regulations, i.e. in “Sea Elegance” case, the investigator suggested that “Serious 
thought should be given to carrying Calcium Hypochlorite in refrigerated containers, 
especially where the transit takes place in or through the tropics, which addresses a 
higher risk of carriage of Calcium Hypochlorite in or through the tropics than IMDG 
Code does.” The similar suggestions were also given by the investigators in “CSAV 
Itajai”, “CMV Punjab” and “Kota Pahlawan” cases (details referred to Table 8 on 
page 36).  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 Discussion of the Findings 
4.1 The Utility of Ghirxi`s Adapted HFACS Framework and 
Taxonomy for the Analysis of Accidents Involving Containerized 
Dangerous Cargo  
 
It always turns out that the very rare accidents are not due to unique causes, but 
rather are due to the unexpected, and therefore in this sense, unique combination of 
common factors (Hollnagel, 2004). The human factor, especially the causal factors 
should not vary so much from different mishaps. In fact, most mishaps have very 
similar causes (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). Ghirxi`s research focuses on the 
engine room fire domain, which belongs to the same maritime sector as this research. 
That is why theoretically his work can be trusted here. This also proves one of the 
purposes of Ghirxi’s study: to provide a platform, which will serve as the foundation 
for more detailed studies (Ghirxi, 2008). 
 
The analysis result has shown that 7 reports yielding out 32 findings, while the 
remaining 5 reports yield nothing. This is not because of the potential disutility of the 
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HFACS framework, but for the following reasons. One is that accident proof was 
hard to be collected for analysis after a fire or explosion, especially after long-time 
fire extinguishing efforts. Almost all the proof such as the source of the fire was 
either consumed or washed or jettisoned. The other reason is because of the 
complicated chemical reaction of the dangerous chemical cargoes which usually 
emanate heat and/or flammable gas in the onset of an accident resulting in 
fire/explosion. It is difficult to artificially replicate the same chemical reaction in the 
laboratory for the proof reason. Like the “LT utile” accident of which the 
investigation did not come to a conclusion, the biggest possibility for the cause of the 
fire which the investigator can hypothesize is the dangerous chemical cargo leaking 
from the package released the heat from the chemical reaction with the scrap iron  
inside the container such as the reducer agent. However this hypothesis was never 
proved during the investigation. 
 
4.2 The multiplicity of unsafe acts involving the stowage planner and 
the shipper 
 
Active failures are committed by those at the “sharp end” or front-line of the system . 
The complexity of the system will contribute to the multiplicity of unsafe acts. All 
unsafe acts can be lumped into a single category, but errors take different forms, 
have different psychological origins, occur in different parts of the system and 
require different methods of management (Reason, 1997). In order to figure out who 
was located at the “sharp-end” of an accident, the investigator has to understand the 
system, especially the function of each part of it. The role of a system model is 
essential in considering how systems can malfunction, or in other words in thinking 
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about accidents. The structure of a system is often less important than the function, 
and the latter may require a breakdown that does not map easily onto the structure 
(Hollnagel, 2008).  
 
Even though the stowage planners are not on board the ship, they are located in the 
front line of the management. In a modern containership company, the stowage 
planner takes the function of the cargo stowage from the chief mate on board the ship, 
while the master and the mate play the supervision role comparatively. This can 
explain why there are not so many precondition factors revealed in the reports, since 
the stowage planner is on the shore side, far away from the investigator. 
 
The shipper’s relationship with the container shipping company is not fully 
investigated in the investigation reports. Consequently there is no enough 
information revealed about the shipper’s failures, such as why the shipper neither 
declared the cargo as dangerous, nor packed the dangerous cargo in compliance with 
statutory requirements. In this sense, this research was not able to reveal any findings 
associated with shipper. The next sub-section 4.3 will try to analyze the functions of 
the shippers from a systematic point of view, hoping to provide the basis for future 
research.  
 
4.3 Tentative Analysis of Barrier Functions of Shipper Regarding 
the Safety Transportation of Containerized Dangerous Cargo  
 
Shippers are closely involved in the transportation service. They are in charge of the 
packing, marking, placarding, labeling and declaring dangerous cargo according to 
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the relevant statutory requirements such as the IMDG Code. All these requirements 
are designed to achieve specific safety functions. Identification of these functions 
will provide useful cues in understanding the whole system, which is the prerequisite 
for the accident investigation. 
 
Defenses are measures designed to protect the hazard or to mitigate the consequences 
of equipment or human failures, compromising both technical and human elements. 
Reason’s model (illustrated in figure 6 on page 18) describes how latent failure 
conditions coming from the organizational processes could degrade the defences, 
thereby leaving the way open for unsafe acts to become accidents. In order to 
identify the human factors, we have to know which attributed defence has failed.  
 
Based on the nature of barriers, the barrier system is classified into the following four 
categories (Hollnagel, 2004): physical or material barrier system, functional (active 
or dynamic) barrier systems, symbolic barrier systems, and incorporeal barrier 
systems.  
 
The shipper, who has the same meaning as “consignor” for the purpose of the IMDG 
Code, means any person, organization or Government which prepares a consignment 
for transport (IMO, 2008b). Provisions are set forth for dangerous goods 
consignments relevant to authorization of consignments and advance notifications, 
packing, marking, labeling, documentation and placarding. 
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4.3.1 PACKING as physical barrier functions 
 
When preparing dangerous goods, the shipper must comply with the IMDG Code 
requirements on packing, so as to ensure the barrier functions of packing are fulfilled 
during the whole transportation. Table 5 shows the examples of the physical 
functions of packing system.  
 
Table 5 -Barrier functions for the shipper as the physical barrier systems 
Barrier functions Examples 
Containing or protecting  
to prevent transporting something from 
the present location (e.g. release) or into 
the present location (penetration) 
Containers, tanks, valves, etc. 
Restraining or preventing  
Movement or transportation of mass or 
energy 
Restricted physical movements of liquid 
(limitation of ullage) 
Keeping together 
Cohesion, resilience, indestructibility 
Components that do not break or fracture 
easily, e.g., safety glass. 
Separating, protecting, blocking Scrubbers, filters,etc.  
Adapted from barrier functions and barrier systems (Hollnagel, 2004) 
 
4.3.2 Documentation, Marking, Labeling, Placarding as symbolic 
barrier functions  
 
Similar to the packing function, the shipper has to prepare the dangerous cargo in 
compliance with the requirements on documentation, marking, labeling and 
placarding. These belong to the symbolic barrier systems as illustrated in table 6.  
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Table 6-Barrier functions for the shipper as the symbolic barrier systems 
Barrier functions Examples 
Countering, preventing or thwarting 
actions(visual, tactile, interface design) 
Coding of functions (colour, shape, 
spatial layout such as marking or labeling 
on the packages and containers) 
Regulating actions Dangerous goods declaration procedure 
Indicating system status or 
condition(signs, signals and symbols) 
Maximum load signs on the container 
and package 
Permission or authorization (or the lack 
thereof) Authorization of dangerous goods 
Communication, interpersonal 
dependency Advance notification of dangerous goods 
Adapted from barrier functions and barrier systems (Hollnagel, 2004) 
 
4.3.3 Statutory Requirements as Incorporeal Barrier Functions 
 
The shipper also undertakes the legal and moral obligation to ensure the safety 
standard of transporting CDG, just like the functions of the incorporeal barrier 
systems as illustrated in table 7. 
 
Table 7- Barrier functions for the shipper as the Incorporeal barrier systems 
Barrier functions Examples 
Complying, conforming to  Self-restraints of shipper, social pressure 
Prescribing: rules, laws, guidelines, 
prohibitions 
Rules stipulated in the bill of lading, 
international or domestic laws 
Adapted from barrier functions and barrier systems (Hollnagel, 2004) 
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The quality of symbolic and incorporeal barriers is highly dependent on humans. 
Since incorporeal barriers depend on the user’s willingness to enforce them, they are 
comparatively not as same efficient and robust as the physical and symbolic barriers. 
They are not applicable to safety critical tasks, and difficult for the evaluation. Their 
availability is also uncertain since it depends on whether the user remembers them in 
the situation. They also completely depend on the user’s compliance. They may 
nevertheless be attractive because the resource needs are low, as is the delay in 
implementation. Unless the population of users has unusually high moral standards, 
incorporeal barrier systems are not recommended, except as a temporary remedy 
(Hollnagel, 2004). The above discussion about the shortcoming of incorporeal 
barriers systems explains to us the reason why the population of shipper is vital 
important for the implementation of IMDG Code, and ultimately responsible for the 
casualty. The classification of barriers is not always a simple matter, but the reward 
is worthwhile in helping us to understand the accident. 
 
4.4 Identified organizational factors including the added up 
statutory factors 
The various ways in which human, technical and organizational factors can combine 
to produce organizational accidents are still not fully known and are perhaps 
ultimately unknowable, since each major organizational accident seems to throw up a 
fresh set of surprises. Organizational factors are universally difficult to be 
investigated, because they have multiple causes involving many people operating at 
different levels of their respective companies (Reason, 1997). They are usually 
located remotely from the front-line, causing additional burdens, such as time and 
money, for the investigating body. Reason further explains this concern from the 
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human resource point of view. This additional evaluative burden is not lightened by 
the fact that most regulatory staffs possess expertise in technical and operational 
matters rather than in human and organizational factors (Reason, 1997). 
 
Organizational factors were found as not being adequately addressed in this research 
either. Only 2 factors were identified excluding the other 5 statutory factors. The 
links between what is perceived to be front-line failures and wrong organizational 
decisions are not significantly identified, conclusions that indicated such do not 
provide a supporting structure as to why it was perceived that the blunt-end 
individuals had failed in their duties.  
 
It is surprising to see that 5 statutory factors were identified from 5 reports showing a 
high identification percentage compared to other organizational factors. This 
coincides with the concern that due to a lack of feedback or otherwise, the IMO 
rule-making process does not keep abreast with technological advances or modern 
designs. This may lead to situations where shortcomings in regulations only come to 
light following the onset of an accident or are revealed by an accident investigation 
(Ghirxi, 2008).  
 
Regulators are uniquely placed to function as one of the most effective defences 
against organizational accidents (Reason, 1997). Just like the above analysis, IMO 
regulations such as the IMDG Code undertake the functions of incorporeal barrier 
systems. They are continually being amended to prohibit actions that have been 
implicated in some recent accident or incident. However regulations and procedures 
share with other feedforward control devices the problem of being insensitive to 
local conditions. From table 8, we can see that the regulator’s failure to identify and 
react to specific dangerous goods contributed to the accident. 
Table 8-Summary of the Statutory Contributing Factors 
Ship name Statutory Contributing factors 
WING ON 
NO.1 
The later investigation report on the regulatory scheme on this issue 
revealed that the existing legislation is inadequate in regulating the 
conveyance of used motor vehicles/cycles and their spare parts. It 
further addressed that the deterrence from the safety guidelines for the 
transport of motor vehicles/cycles is insufficient and too indirect.  
SEA 
ELEGANCE 
After a number of incidents with Calcium Hypochlorite, the Salvage 
Association and the International Group of P&I Clubs issued pertinent 
recommendations, which addressed higher risks of carrying Calcium 
Hypochlorite than IMDG Code does. Plus, the recommendations of 
this investigation report suggested that the IMO DSC sub-committee 
should be asked to further investigate the carriage requirements of 
Calcium Hypochlorite and amend the IMDG Code as appropriate. 
Serious thought should be given to carrying Calcium Hypochlorite in 
refrigerated containers, especially where the transit takes place in or 
through the tropics, which addresses a higher risk of carriage of 
Calcium Hypochlorite in or through the tropics than IMDG Code does. 
CSAV 
ITAJAI 
It is recommended that further precautionary measures should be 
considered by the IMO DSC subcommittee to control the temperature 
of Thiourea Dioxide throughout the carriage process, like stowage 
away from radiant heat or for carriage in reefer containers or 
ventilation.  
CMV 
PUNJAB 
It is recommended that further precautionary measures should be 
considered by the IMO DSC subcommittee to designate NiMH 
rechargeable batteries as dangerous cargo or cargo to be cooled.  
KOTA 
PAHLAWAN 
The ATSB has advised that xanthates have a recognized capacity to 
emit the odour of carbon disulphide even when packaged in 
accordance with the IMDG Code and an odour from xanthates 
shipments, similar to Kota Pahlawan`s, is commonplace according to 
their Australian importers. This suggests that the information for 
xanthates and requirements for their carriage, in particular the 
packaging, provided in the Code is not enough to address the hazard, 
and thus should be reviewed.  
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Of course it is fair to say that the regulators cannot foresee all the possible scenarios 
of failure in complex, tightly-coupled and highly interactive systems, so cannot 
universally prescribe particular types of human response. The regulator’s position 
within the affected organization means that they are likely to attract blame from all 
directions. Since standing as they do on the organizational borders of all hazardous 
technologies, their sphere of responsibilities is bound to be implicated in a wide 
variety of contributing factors. However, if the regulators are to be other than 
convenient scapegoats, they will have to be provided with the legislation, the 
resources and the tools to do their jobs effectively (Reason, 1997). 
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Chapter 5 Limitations of Research, Conclusions and Future 
Research 
 
The main motivation trying to understand accidents is to prevent them from 
happening again (Hollnagel, 2004). However there are always limitations to this 
objective from the reality or the theoretical world. This chapter will try to address 
these limitations from different points of views. 
 
5.1 Limitation of data in revealing any statistical trend 
 
The problem in accident analysis is mainly to get sufficient data and information 
about what took place (Hollnagel, 2004). In this research, the utility of the HFACS 
framework in identifying and classifying human factors from the reports is also 
limited by the data and information contained in the accident reports.  
 
First, only 12 investigation reports were retrieved from global sources on the 
web-base. For the remaining relevant accidents involving CDG, the investigations 
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were either not carried out or not revealed to the public or not available in English. 
Second, since a written account has the effect of “digitizing” what in the original was 
a complex and continuous set of “analogue” events, an accident report will always 
contain less information than was potentially available (Reason, 1990). Third, most 
importantly, the inquisition of the investigator is not thorough enough to discuss the 
organizational being of the system under investigation (Ghirxi, 2008). Only 2 
organizational factors were identified in the analysis apart from the remaining 5 
organizational factors which were all lumped into statutory category. For the 
investigation carried out after 2000 when the “Guidelines for The Investigation of 
Human Factors in Marine Casualties and Incidents” (Resolution A. 884(21)) was 
adopted to amend Resolution A.849 (20), the analysis result did not reveal any 
meaningful change in terms of human factors found compared to those carried out 
before 2000.  
 
The retrieved human and organizational factors may be used for more general 
consideration of shipping, but are not enough to reveal any convincible statistical 
trend with the purpose of improving the safe transportation of CDG.  
 
5.2 Limitation of HFACS framework in identifying Human Factors  
 
The utility of the HFACS framework in identifying human factors / the weakness 
within the system has been tested and proved in this research, but its theoretical 
limitation is more worthwhile to be discussed here from an academic perspective. 
The HFACS framework is built on Reason’s human factor model, which belongs to 
the group of epidemiological models. Thus, the HFACS framework inherits the 
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shortcomings from it.  
 
Epidemiological models are structurally and functionally underspecified but are 
valuable because they provide a basis for discussing the complexity of accidents that 
overcome the limitations of sequential models. Unfortunately, epidemiological 
models are never stronger than the analogy they use, and they are often difficult to 
specify in further detail, even though they have been instrumental in developing 
methods that can be used to characterize the general “health” of a system (Reason, 
1997). In this sense, Reason` model is insufficiently specific regarding the nature of 
the holes in the cheese and their inter-relationships (Reason, 2006).  
 
If a system is described using an epidemiological model type, then accident analysis 
becomes a search for known carriers and latent conditions. The underlying 
assumption is that defences and barriers can be strengthened to prevent future 
accidents from taking place, even though the detailed pathways may be uncertain 
(Hollnagel, 2008). 
 
Rather than describing the accident and finally giving the clues for the solution, the 
HFACS framework concentrates on the classification of human factors in each level 
within the organization to give a data-driven basis for the analytical utility. Or like 
Reason declares: “we cannot prevent latent conditions from being seeded into the 
system since they are inevitable product of strategic decisions. All we can usefully do 
is to make them visible to those manage and operate the organization so that the 
worst of them, at any one time, can be corrected (Reason, 1997).”  
 
In the realm of error management, HFACS tools can be regarded as the starting point 
or the basis to provide a discussion platform, and a communicating language for all 
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parties involved in error management. However this utility is still far from the 
purpose of Karl Weick (1991): “to anticipate and forestall disaster is to understand 
regularities in the way small events can combine to have disproportionately large 
effects (Weick, 1991).”  
 
In order to understand accidents it is necessary to describe them, and the description 
inevitably involves the use of an accident model. The three types of accident models, 
the sequential models, the epidemiological models and the systemic models, 
correspond to the gradual realization that accidents are due to complex coincidences 
rather than root causes (Hollnagel, 2004).  
 
A more advanced model is needed to fulfill this task such as the systemic models. 
The overriding advantage of systemic models is their emphasis that accident analysis 
must be based on an understanding of the functional characteristics of the system, 
rather than on assumptions or hypotheses concerning interaction between structures 
or internal mechanisms as provided by standard representations of, e.g., information 
processing or failure pathways (Hollnagel, 2008). 
 
5.3 Limitation of the “Stop Rules” of the Investigation in Revealing 
Shipper’s contributing factors 
 
Ghirxi expanded the HFACS framework to regulator level by adding up statutory and 
flag state factors into the organizational level. It is found helpful in identifying 
relevant organizational factors in this research. Five statutory factors were 
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recognized from 5 reports.  
 
The efforts to identify the contributing factors associated with the shippers failed to 
reveal any results. This is because that compared to statutory factors, it is harder to 
blame the shipper who is usually located in another country/region different from the 
investigating state. Because of the sovereign rights, the investigating country can not 
go to another country to investigate the shipper. Consequently, information related to 
the shipper is not investigated and the links between the shippers and the shipping 
companies are not addressed.  
 
Reason also observes this concern. He points out that leaving aside legal concern 
with responsibility, accident investigations are carried out for two main reasons: to 
establish what occurred and to stop something like it happening in the future. Both of 
these ends are best satisfied by limiting the scope of the analysis to those things over 
which the people involved, and most particularly the system manager, might 
reasonably be expected to exercise some control (Reason, 1997). 
 
Our main interest must be in the changeable and the controllable. For these reasons, 
and because the quantity and reliability of the relevant information will deteriorate 
rapidly with increasing distance from the event itself, the accident causation model 
presented in figure 6 (page 19) must, of necessity, be confined largely to the 
manageable boundaries of the organization concerned (Reason, 1997). 
 
This is why Reason’s human error model stops at the production organization 
boundary (see figure 7). The raw material provider, like the shipper, is not addressed 
in this model; the philosophy behind it is that the hazard embodied in the raw 
material will be filtered out or controlled by the defences provided in the safety 
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management system. For instance, the newly produced container should be examined 
and endorsed by the competent organization before being put into service to ensure it 
is safe enough for service.  
 
Layout of the essential elements of the production organization 
Shipper 
organization 
 
Figure 7- Interaction between the production and the shipper organization 
Adapted from Human Error (Reason, 1990) 
 
With globalization, the supply chain has changed so much that the supplier is 
regarded as part of the production system. Just like the shipper, they not only provide 
cargo for the shipping company, but also are responsible for the safety defense 
system of the cargo, e.g., packing, marking, placarding, labeling and declaring. In 
this sense, the production system defined in figure 7 has been expanded to the 
shipper. Consequently, the scope of the investigation should be expanded to the 
shipper as well.  
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 Over the past 30 years, the search for the causes of a major catastrophe has spread 
steadily outwards in scope and backwards in time to uncover increasingly more 
remote contributions (Reason, 1997). Since time and causality are seamless, they 
have no natural breakpoints, only artificially imposed ones. Accident analysts, just 
like historians, are limited by their resources and by the availability of reliable 
evidence.  
 
5.4 Conclusion and future research 
 
The utility of Ghirxi’s adapted HFACS framework and the corresponding taxonomy 
in the domain of accidents involving CDG was tested in this research. The testing 
result is positive when the scope is limited to shipping company. However it is 
doubtful when the scope is expanded to the shipper. Based on the collected data of 
this research, the HFACS tool is not able to draw both shipping company and the 
shipper into one conceptual framework. The reason of it has been discussed in the 
paper.  
 
The relationship between the theoretical model and supporting database is interactive. 
The utility of the model is limited by the shortage of data in the real world. In the 
context of accidents involving CDG, the utility of HFACS framework is also limited 
by the insufficient investigation reports. The human factors retrieved from the 
investigation reports were not able to reveal any meaningful trends, especially those 
associated with the shipper. This is mainly because of the insufficiency of the 
investigation.  
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 It has been proved by this research that the shipper of CDG plays a very important 
role in containership accident. Thus, it is important to examine the reasons which 
prevent the shipper from achieving safety goals in maritime domain. To fulfill this 
objective, specific theoretical model and database are necessary of being created to 
guide the future investigation and study.  
 
There are two other available data sources related to incidents involving CDG apart 
from the collected investigation reports in this research. One is the inspection data 
coming from Container Inspection Programme launched by IMO since 1996 among 
its member States. The other is Hazardous Material Incident Reporting System 
(HMIRS) operated by Department of Transportation, U.S. Are there methods 
available to qualify the reliability of such data? What is the difference between data 
contained in the investigation reports and those provided in such sources? These 
raised questions are waiting to be answered by the future research. 
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Appendix 1  
Fire/explosion accidents emanating from container cargo areas  
in 1990-2009 periods 
Ship name Flag Accident date 
Ever Group Taiwan 1990-6-14 
Neptune Ruby Singapore 1991-3-31 
Bay of Bengal Singapore 1991-3-31 
Glorious Ocean Panama 1992-4-17 
Tokyo Senator Germany 1994-4-28 
President Washington U.S.A. 1994-5-7 
Contship Asia Germany 1994-6-9 
Norasia Susan Germany 1994-6-12 
California Luna Panama 1995-4-16 
Contship Pacific Germany 1996-7-24 
Contship France Germany 1997-10-15 
Sealand mariner Marshall Islands 1998-4-18 
Aconagua Germany 1998-6-20 
DG Harmony Isle of Man 1998-11-9 
Wong On No.1 HongKong 1999-5-25 
CMA Djakarta Antigua & Barbuda 1999-7-10 
Ever Decent Panama 1999-8-23 
Uni Winner Panama 2000-6-9 
Saudi Jeddah Bahamas 2000-6-11 
Contship Champion Germany 2000-6-24 
Choyang Success Panama 2000-9-19 
CMA CGM Puget Panama 2000-9-19 
Kitano Japan 2001-3-22 
Wan Hai 161 Taiwan 2001-7-18 
Hanjin Pennsylvania Liberia 2002-11-11 
Sloman Traveller Antigua & Barbuda 2003-1-12 
Ara J. Antigua & Barbuda 2003-1-22 
LT Grand Italy 2003-2-17 
LT Utile Panama 2003-8-3 
Sea Elegance Singapore 2003-10-11 
MSC Paraguay Panama 2003-12-12 
Csav Itajai Marshall Islands 2004-2-28 
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NYK Argus Panama 2004-10-19 
Glory Bridge Liberia 2005-3-14 
Punjab Senator Germany 2005-6-2 
Norasia Taurus Antigua & Barbuda 2005-7-16 
Pac Makassar Singapore 2005-8-5 
Horizon Navigator U.S.A. 2005-8-12 
MOL Renaissance Liberia 2005-12-29 
Hyundai Fortune Panama 2006-3-21 
YM Green Liberia 2006-8-6 
YM Comfort Taiwan 2007-3-10 
Zim Haifa Israel 2007-7-2 
CMA CGM Fidelio France 2007-7-4 
MSC Roma Liberia 2008-3-9 
Chastine Maersk Denmark 2008-8-13 
Montreal Senator Cyprus 2008-8-27 
APL Peru Antigua & Barbuda 2008-10-8 
Maersk Itea Liberia 2008-11-3 
Tini From Antigua & Barbuda 2008-11-27 
YM Union Liberia 2008-12-2 
Hyundai Long Beach U.K. 2009-2-5 
Iran Ilam Iran 2009-2-5 
MOL Prosperity Panama 2009-7-2 
MSC Ines Panama 2009-7-15 
Total 55 accidents in 1990-2009 periods 
Source: data retrieved from Lloyd’s MIU casualty database and English publications from 
maritime accident investigation website of different countries
Appendix 2  
Coding of Human factor retrieved from investigation reports 
 
Only factors within the scope of shipping company which is regarded as the main 
organization to be analyzed will be retrieved from the reports. The other human 
factors contained in the reports will be discussed in the remarks such as the unsafe 
acts by the shipper or the maintenance organization. 
 
The “MOR U.K.” accident 
(Source: retrieved from:  
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/marine/1995/index.asp) 
 
No human contributing factor revealed. 
(Remark: there is one contributing factor of shipper indentified by the report. That is 
the suspect tank containing between 20 and 80 percent of their capacity should not 
offered for transport by ship. But the information provided in the report is not enough 
to trace other contributing factors back to the higher level of category. ) 
 
The “SEALAND MARINER” accident 
(Source: retrieved from:  
http://www.register-iri.com/content/maritimese/investigationreports.cfm) 
 
UNSAFE ACTS: 
AE 103 FAILURE TO SEE AND AVOID 
The stowage planner of the charterer failed to perceive the undeclared dangerous 
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cargoes listed in the shipping paper, and mistakenly stowed them into cargo hold 
without ventilation which is contrary to the Code. 
 
AE 201 RISK ASSESSMENT DURING OPERATION 
The maintenance team failed to adequately evaluate the explosive risks associated 
with the hot work around the container. The concentration of explosive gas in the 
No.7 hold emanating from the dangerous cargoes container is not detected by the 
crew, and finally ignited by the falling hot slag. 
 
PRECONDITIONS:  
PE 205 BARRIERS 
The placarding and marking of the container and the declaration of the dangerous 
cargo are regarded as preventive barriers. In this case, the shipper not declaring the 
dangerous cargo is regarded as a failed barrier. 
 
SUPERVISION: 
SI 001 LEADERSHIP/SUPERVISION/OVERSIGHT INADEQUATE 
The chief mate failed to review the cargo documents for possible oversight on the 
part of the person preparing the documents (the stowage planner of the charterer). 
 
SI 004 SUPERVISION-POLICY 
Lacking of enough policy on guiding the hot work around the container area on 
board ships contributes to the ignorance of the maintenance crew, despite that several 
studies have shown that shippers do not always follow IMDG guidelines when 
packing containers, and as a result, the atmosphere in or around the container may 
present an unexpected explosive or flammable environment. 
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SI 007 FAILED TO PROVIDE CURRENT PUBLIC/ADEQUATE TECHNICAL 
DATA OR PROCEDURES 
The current technical information related to the risk of container cargoes, especially 
dangerous containers, is not provided to the master and chief mate early enough 
before departure by the charterer. 
 
(Remark: There are three contributing factors with regard to the shipper. One is 
failing to properly declare and document the hazard class on the shipping papers 
presented to the vessel`s agent; The second is failing to mark and placard the 
container; The last is failing to pack the cargo in accordance with the IMDG Code 
requirements. But the information provided in the report is not enough to trace other 
contributing factors back to the higher level of category.) 
 
The “WING ON NO.1” accident 
(Source: retrieved from: http://www.mardep.gov.hk/en/publication/ereport.html) 
 
UNSAFE ACTS: 
AE 103 FAILURE TO SEE AND AVOID 
The stowage planner of the company failed to perceive the risk of hydrogen 
explosion, thus not provide ventilation to prevent the accumulation of hydrogen. 
 
SUPERVISION: 
SI 007 FAILED TO PROVIDE CURRENT PUBLIC/ADEQUATE TECHNICAL 
DATA OR PROCEDURES 
The current technical information related to the dangerous cargo manifest is not 
possessed by the crew causing the non-awareness of the risk existing currently. 
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ORGANIZATION: 
OR 003 TRAINING 
As revealed in the latter investigation report on the regulatory scheme of this issue, it 
was found that little has been done in providing or facilitating the provision of 
practical training to operators and workers on the safety precautions and safe 
working practices.  
 
FS 001 RULE-MAKING PROCESS 
The later investigation report on the regulatory scheme on this issue revealed that the 
existing legislation is inadequate in regulating the conveyance of used motor 
vehicles/cycles and their spare parts. It further addressed that the deterrence from the 
safety guidelines for the transport of motor vehicles/cycles is insufficient and too 
indirect.  
 
The “KITANO” accident 
(Source: retrieved from:  
http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/marine/2001/index.asp) 
 
(Remark: There is no cause and contributing factors identified in this accident 
investigation. The main reason is that the source of ignition could not be identified 
even though the source of fire has been identified as “activiated carbon pellet 
impregnated with potassium hydroxide (caustic potash)”. The investigation further 
explained that “in spite of the fact that the carbon pellets showed signs of self 
heating”, they were not required to be classified as a class 4.2, packing group III 
cargo, because they were transported in package with a volume of not more than 3 
squre meters.”)  
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The “SEA ELEGANCE” accident 
(Source: DSC 10/INF.2, retrieved from IMO document website) 
 
UNSAFE ACTS: 
AE 103 FAILURE TO SEE AND AVOID 
The stowage planner of shipping company failed to perceive the undeclared cargo, 
“Calcium Hypochlotire”, and mistakenly stowed it on the bottom tier, against the 
port H.O. service tank, with the engine room bulkhead in the front which are contrary 
to the Code. 
 
PRECONDITION: 
PE 205 BARRIERS 
The placarding and labeling on the container and the declaration on the dangerous 
cargo document are regarded as preventive barriers. In this case, the shipper not 
declaring the dangerous cargo is regarded as failed barrier. 
 
SUPERVISION: 
SI 007 FAILED TO PROVIDE CURRENT PUBLIC/ADEQUATE TECHNICAL 
DATA OR PROCEDURES 
After the accident happened, it took the ship more than 24 hours to present a full 
manifest of all cargo to the authority. This proved itself that the shipping company, in 
her organizational level, failed to provide adequate information of cargo which is 
necessary for the fire mitigation. 
 
ORGANIZATION: 
FS 001 RULE-MAKING PROCESS 
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After a number of incidents with Calcium Hypochlorite, the Salvage Association and 
the International Group of P&I Clubs issued pertinent recommendations, which 
addressed higher risks of carrying Calcium Hypochlorite than IMDG Code does. 
Plus, Recommendations of this investigation report has suggested that the IMO DSC 
sub-committee should be asked to further investigate the carriage requirements of 
Calcium Hypochlorite and amend the IMDG Code as appropriate. The serious 
thought should be given to carry Calcium Hypochlorite in refrigerated containers, 
specially where the transit takes place in or through the tropics, which addressed 
higher risk of carriage of Calcium Hypochlorite in or through the tropics than IMDG 
Code does.  
 
(Remark: One contributing factor that the dangerous cargo is not declared by the 
shipper is identified, But the information provided in the report is not enough to trace 
other contributing factors back to the higher level of category) 
 
The “LT UTILE” accident 
(Source: retrieved from China Maritime Safety Administration) 
 
No human factor revealed in the report. 
(Remark: Even though the source of fire is identified, but the source of ignition is not 
because the whole cargo and container are destroyed by the fire, resulting in no proof 
to testify the contributing factor to the fire. But the investigator tried to identify the 
risk of self ignition of subject cargo especially when contacting with reducer agent 
surrounding it after leaking from the collapsed package during long time 
transportation.) 
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The “CSAV ITAJAI” accident 
(Source: DSC 10/INF.2 , retrieved from IMO document website) 
 
UNSAFE ACTS: 
AE 103 FAILURE TO SEE OR AVOID 
The stowage planner failed to perceive and react to the situation that the subject 
container was stowed under deck (contrary to IMDG Code requirements), which 
contains the temperature sensitive cargo inside. To make the situation even worse, 
the container is put adjacent to the engine room.  
 
PRECONDITIONS: 
PE 202 AUTOMATION 
Reliance was placed on a computer program/disc input to highlight the problematic 
stowage, but the system failed to indicate the UN3341 Thiourea Dioxide requires “on 
deck” category D stowage only.  
 
SUPERVISION: 
SI 001 LEADERSHIP/SUPERVISION/OVERSIGHT INADEQUATE 
The second physical check with the IMDG Code is overlooked by the captain since 
the first electric check carried out has shown no alarm. The supervision and oversight 
from shipping company and the captain was not enough to identify the stowage 
hazard, and finally created the unsafe situation. 
 
SI 007 FAILED TO PROVIDE CURRENT PUBLIC/ADEQUATE TECHNICAL 
DATA OR PROCEDURES 
After the accident happened, it took the ship more than 5 days to present the cargo 
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manifest in No.6 hold to the authority. This proved itself that the shipping company, 
in her organizational level, failed to provide adequate cargo information to master or 
his representive in advance of loading, which maybe is necessary for proper stowage 
and safe carriage of the cargo. 
 
ORGANIZATION: 
FS 001 RULE-MAKING PROCESS 
It is recommended that further precautionary measures should be considered, by the 
IMO DSC subcommittee, to control the temperature of “Thiourea Dioxide” 
throughout the carriage process, like stowage away from radiant heat or for carriage 
in reefer container or ventilation.  
 
The “CMV PUNJAB SENATOR” accident 
(Source: investigation report number:187/05, retrieved from the publication of the 
website : http://www.bsu-bund.de/) 
 
UNSAFE ACTS: 
AE 103 FAILURES TO SEE OR AVOID 
The stowage planner failed to perceive the situation that the rechargeable batteries 
were stowed directly against the partition wall to the heavy oil settling tank in the 
cargo hold 6 for 14 days, resulting in the high temperature of carriage.  
 
PRECONDITIONS: 
PE 214 CARGO SPACE SYSTEM KNOWLEDGE 
The stowage planner has no knowledge about ship’s drawing, resulting in stowing 
temperature sensitive rechargeable batteries against the partition wall to the heavy oil 
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settling tank in the cargo hold no.6. 
 
SUPERVISION: 
SI 001 LEADERSHIP/SUPERVISION/OVERSIGHT INADEQUATE 
The supervision and oversight from shipping company and the captain was not 
enough to identify the stowage hazard, and finally created the unsafe situation. 
 
SI 007 FAILED TO PROVIDE CURRENT PUBLIC/ADEQUATE TECHNICAL 
DATA OR PROCEDURES 
The technical information, ship’s drawing of cargo hold no.6, related to the cargo 
stowage is not provided to the charterer who is in charge of cargo stowage, resulting 
in stowing temperature sensitive rechargeable batteries against the partition wall to 
the heavy oil settling tank in the cargo hold no.6. 
 
SI 007 FAILED TO PROVIDE CURRENT PUBLIC/ADEQUATE TECHNICAL 
DATA OR PROCEDURES 
The information related to subject cargo containers is not directed to the vessel’s 
command, who thus failed to direct his attention to the risk resulting from the 
mistaken stowage of the cargo. 
 
ORGANIZATION:  
OR 205 POOR SHIP DESIGN 
The shipbuilding regulations should be reviewed in order to insulate cargo from 
sources of heat due to vessel operations. 
 
FS 001 RULE-MAKING PROCESS 
It is recommended that further precautionary measures should be considered, by the 
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IMO DSC subcommittee, to designate the NiMH rechargeable batteries as dangerous 
cargo or cargo to be cooled.  
 
The “KOTA PAHLAWAN” accident  
(Source: retrieved from: 
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/safety-investigation-reports.aspx?mode=Marine) 
 
ORGANIZATION: 
FS 001 RULE-MAKING PROCESS 
The ATSB has advised that xanthates have a recognized capacity to emit the odour of 
carbon disulphide even when packaged in accordance with the IMDG Code and an 
odour from xanthates shipments, similar to Kota Pahlawan`s, is commonplace 
according to their Australian importers. This suggests that the information for 
xanthates and requirements for their carriage, in particular the packaging, provided in 
the Code is not enough to address the hazard, and thus should be reviewed.  
 
(Remark:The xanthates carried by Kota Pahlawan were not hermetically sealed 
strictly by the shipper in accordance with the IMDG Code. This is also regarded as 
commonplace that an odour coming out in the packing industry according to the 
investigation report. But the information provided in the report is not enough to trace 
other contributing factors back to the higher level of category.) 
 
The “DUTCH NAVIGATOR” accident 
(Source: investigation report number: 37/2002, retrieved from: 
http://www.maib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/2002/dutch_navigator.cf
m) 
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UNSAFE ACTS: 
AE 103 FAILURE TO SEE AND AVOID 
The mate failed to be aware of the overstowage requirement from the IMDG Code 
and relevant UK regulation, and ultimately overstowed the tank container on top of 
each other. 
 
AE 103 FAILURE TO SEE AND AVOID 
The mate failed to see that excessive container stack masses has exceeded the 
recommendation from the cargo securing manual, maybe resulting in the excessive 
racking load. 
 
SUPERVISION: 
SI 001 LEADERSHIP/SUPERVISION/OVERSIGHT INADEQUATE 
Master failed to recognize the overstowage by the mate of the tank container on top 
of each other.  
 
SI 001 LEADERSHIP/SUPERVISION/OVERSIGHT INADEQUATE 
Master failed to recognize the excessive container stack masses, maybe resulting in 
the excessive racking load. 
 
SI 007 FAILED TO PROVIDE  CURRENT PUBLIC/ADEQUATE TECHNICAL 
DATA OR PROCEDURES 
It is found during investigation that the UK regulation relevant to the dangerous 
cargoes carriage was not provided on board ship.  
(Remark: The framework and the liner integrity of the tank container were impaired 
due to the improper repair by the maintenance organization, contributing to the 
collapse of the framework and the leakage of the content. But the information 
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provided in the report is not enough to trace other contributing factors back to the 
higher level of category.) 
 
The “CMA CGM Fidelto” accident 
(Source: retrieved from China Maritime Safety Administration) 
 
No human factor revealed in the report. 
(Remark: the investigation did not reveal the causes of the explosion, and failed to 
trace back to other higher level human contributing factors. ) 
 
The “Hanjin London” accident 
(Source: investigation report number:304/06, retrieved from the publication of the 
website : http://www.bsu-bund.de/) 
 
No human factor revealed in the report. 
(Remark: the primary cause of the accident was no longer possible to be identified by 
the investigation.) 
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UNSAFE ACTS 
 
Acts: Factors that have happened on board the vessel where the accident/incident has 
happened.  Acts are active actions committed by the crew members, resulting in an 
error or an unsafe situation.  Acts are not limited to marine engineers, irrespective of 
whether they form part of an engine-room watch system. 
 
ERRORS: Factors in a mishap when mental or physical activities of the crew members 
fail to achieve their intended outcome as a result of skill-based, perceptual, or 
judgement and decision making errors leading to an unsafe situation.  Errors are 
unintended. AE xxx 
 
Skill-based errors (AE 100) – Factors in a mishap when errors occur in the crew 
member’s execution of a routine, highly practiced (automated) task relating to 
procedure, training or proficiency and result in an unsafe situation. 
AE 101 A factor when the individual’s movements inadvertently activate or 
deactivate equipment, controls or switches when there is no intent to 
operate the control or device.  This action may be noticed or unnoticed by 
the individual. 
AE 102 A factor when the individual fails to achieve his intentions because it is 
expected that a considerable number of cues be processed in a critical time 
period. 
AE 103 A factor when an individual fails to perceive and react to a situation, 
resulting in an undesired outcome. 
AE 104 A factor when an individual inadvertently fails to render the necessary 
attention to a particular detail due to the unfolding situation. 
AE 105 A factor when an individual’s techniques fall short of expected engineering 
techniques and good seamanship practices. 
AE 106 A factor when an individual responds inappropriately to conditions by 
either over-controlling or under-controlling the machinery space system.  
The error may be a result of preconditions or a temporary failure of 
coordination. 
AE 107 A factor when an individual relies on automation to the extent that he is 
unaware of the status of the system and is not able to deduce the corrective 
action to mitigate the unfolding situation. 
AE 108 A factor when an individual aptitude reflects a regular negative overt 
expression of one’s own personality. 
AE 109 A factor when the individual, through an act of omission or commission, 
either makes a checklist error or fails to run an appropriate checklist and 
this failure results in an unsafe situation. 
AE 110 A factor when the individual, misses critical step/s in a procedural activity 
due to memory failures when acting under stress. 
AE 111 A factor when the individual does not make use of an established 
procedure. 
AE 112 A factor when an individual inadvertently fails to prioritise attention due to 
memory failures when acting under stress. 
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Decision and judgement errors (AE 200) – Factors in a mishap when behaviour or 
actions of the individual proceed as intended yet the chosen plan proves inadequate to 
achieve the desired end-state and results in an unsafe situation. 
AE 201 When the individual fails to adequately evaluate the risks associated with a 
particular course of action and this faulty evaluation leads to inappropriate 
decision and subsequent unsafe situation.  This failure occurs in real-time 
when formal risk-assessment procedures are not possible. 
AE 202 When the individual does not organise, based on accepted prioritisation 
techniques, the tasks needed to manage the immediate situation. 
AE 203 When the individual takes the necessary action as dictated by the situation 
but performs these actions too quickly and the rush in taking action leads to 
an unsafe situation. 
AE 204 When the individual selects a course of action but elects to delay execution 
of the actions and the delay leads to an unsafe situation. 
AE 205 When a caution or warning is perceived, understood but ignored by the 
individual, leading to an unsafe situation. 
AE 206 When the individual, through faulty logic selects the wrong course of 
action in a time-constrained environment. 
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Perceptual errors (AE 300) – Factors in a mishap when misperception of an object, 
threat or situation (such as visual, auditory, proprioceptive, or vestibular illusions, 
cognitive or attention failures) results in human error. 
AE 301 When the individual acts or fails to act based on an illusion, misperception 
or disorientation state and this act or failure to act creates an unsafe 
situation. 
AE 302 When an individual acts or fails to act appropriately due to degraded or 
unusual sensory input, leaving the individual to make a decision based on 
faulty information.  It is the crew member’s response to the illusion or 
disorientation that is classified as a perceptual error and not the illusion or 
disorientation per se. 
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VIOLATIONS: Factors in a mishap when the actions of the operator represent wilful 
disregard for rules and instructions and lead to an unsafe situation. AV xxx 
 
Routine violations (AV 400) – Factors in a mishap when violations are committed by 
crew members in a habitual manner and are often tolerated by line and organisational 
management. 
AV 401 A factor when the consequences/risk of violating published procedures 
were recognised, consciously assessed and honestly determined by the 
individual or crew to be the best course of action.  Routine “work-arounds” 
and unofficial procedures that are accepted by the organisation on board as 
necessary for operations are also captured under this code. 
AV 402 A factor when a crew member carries out a routine job without the 
adequate familiarisation required in the SMS of the company. 
AV 403 A factor when a crew member wilfully operates or maintains a piece of 
equipment or auxiliary machinery without the necessary consent required 
by the SMS of the company.  Consent may either be written in the form of 
permits of verbal instructions. 
AV 404 A factor when a crew member wilfully operates or maintains a piece of 
equipment or auxiliary machinery without being provided with the 
necessary theoretical and practical training. 
AV 405 A factor when a crew member wilfully operates or maintains a piece of 
equipment or auxiliary machinery without observing the instructions 
provided in the manufacturer’s manual. 
AV 406 A factor when a crew member wilfully operates or maintains a piece of 
equipment or auxiliary machinery without observing machinery space 
standing orders and regulations. 
AV 407 A factor when following an alarm, a crew member wilfully fails to take 
corrective or remedial actions to safeguard the operation of the equipment 
or auxiliary machinery. 
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Exceptional violations (AV 500) – Factors in a mishap when violations have been 
committed in exceptional circumstances.  These violations neither reflect the typical 
character of the crew member nor are condoned by the management of the vessel.  
Violations are exceptional not because they are extreme in nature but because they do 
not represent the typical behaviour of the crew member. 
AV 501 A factor when the wilful actions or inactions of the crew member result in 
the system operating beyond its limits. 
AV 502 A factor when a crew member wilfully accepts unnecessary hazards to 
create an unsafe situation. 
AV 503 A factor when a crew member takes over an machinery space watch 
without being qualified in accordance with the flag State regulations. 
AV 504 A factor when the crew member wilfully sets the system to operate beyond 
its design parameters. 
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PRECONDITIONS FOR UNSAFE ACTS 
 
Preconditions: Factors in a mishap if active and/or latent preconditions such as 
conditions of the operators, environmental or personnel factors affect practices, 
conditions or actions of individuals and result in human error or an unsafe situation. 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS: Factors in a mishap if physical or technological 
factors affect practices, conditions and actions of individual and result in human error 
or an unsafe situation. PE xxx 
 
Physical environment (PE 100) – Factors in a mishap if environmental phenomena 
such as weather and climate affect the actions of individuals and result in human error 
or an unsafe situation. 
PE 101 A factor when the individual is exposed to heat resulting in compromised 
function, or interferes with the normal performance of duties. 
PE 102 A factor when the absence, pattern, intensity or location of the light fitting 
prevents or interferes with safe task accomplishment. 
PE 103 A factor when the intensity or duration is sufficient to adversely affect safe 
task accomplishment. 
PE 104 A factor when acceleration forces or manoeuvres cause or contribute to 
damage, injury, prevent or interfere with the performance of normal duties. 
PE 105 A factor when either exposure to chemical agents, fumes, fuels or oils is 
severe and interferes with the normal performance of normal duties or else 
machinery space lack of cleanliness contributes to the spread/intensity of a 
fire. 
PE 106 A factor when any noise not directly related to the information needed for 
task accomplishment interferes with the individual’s ability to perform that 
task. 
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Technological environment (PE 200) – Factors in a mishap if machinery space, 
engine control room and workshop design factors, automation or technical 
procedural/drawings affect the actions of individuals and result in human error or 
unsafe situation. 
PE 201 A factor when the location, shape, size, design, reliability, lighting or other 
aspect of a control or switch is inadequate and this leads to an unsafe 
situation. 
PE 202 A factor when the design, function, reliability, use guidance, symbology, 
logic or other aspect of automated systems creates an unsafe situation. 
PE 203 A factor when the design of machinery and layout has an adverse impact on 
the individual’s performance. 
PE 204 A factor when communication equipment is inadequate or unavailable to 
support machinery space job demands.  This includes electronically or 
physically blocked transmissions.  Communications can be voice, data or 
multi-sensory. 
PE 205 A factor when other physical, functional and symbolic barriers are missing 
or inadequate, lead to an unsafe situation.  Barriers functions captured 
include active, passive, preventive and reactive. 
PE 206 A factor when the equipment is unsafe, directly leading to an unsafe 
situation or else may cause an individual to become distracted from the task 
due to concern for personal safety. 
PE 207 A factor when the tools used are unsuitable or inadequate for the task 
performed and this leads to an unsafe situation. 
PE 208 A factor when the fault isolation and detection is difficult, installation is 
error prone, multiple similar connections exist on the system or different 
sized fasteners can be installed in multiple locations, which can lead to an 
unsafe situation. 
PE 209 A factor when it is a real contributor rather than an inconvenience.  In such 
cases, the components or area to be maintained is surrounded by structure, 
no access doors exist in the maintenance area, there is a lack of footing 
space or handholds or the area is small or odd-shaped. 
PE 210 A factor when similar parts on different machinery are installed differently, 
thereby leading to an unsafe act.  This also applies to different machinery 
fitted on different ships. 
PE 211 A factor when the part or tool is not owned or not in stock on board or is 
not available for procurement, even if the ship remains seaworthy. 
PE 212 A factor when the hand marked labelling is incorrect or a wrong part 
number on the part leads to the selection of the incorrect part. 
PE 213 A factor when the part can be easily installed with wrong orientation, there 
are no orientation indicators or connections are identical in size, colour or 
length, leading to an unsafe situation. 
PE 214 A factor when the individual has no knowledge of the machinery space 
schematics and line/electrical installations. 
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PE 215 A factor when the individual finds the information provided problematic 
due to unfamiliar words, non-standard format, poor or insufficient 
illustrations, lack of detail or missing steps and poor writings, leading to an 
unsafe situation. 
PE 216 A factor when a procedure does not exist, not located in a correct or usual 
place or near the worksite in the machinery space, leading to an unsafe 
situation. 
PE 217 A factor when the individual finds that a procedure has missing pages, not 
revised, does not match machinery configuration, transferred from the 
source document incorrectly, steps are out of sequence or procedure does 
not work, leading to an unsafe situation. 
PE 218 A factor when the individual finds similar procedures in different resources, 
which do not agree, too many references to other documents and 
configurations shown in different resources do not agree, leading to an 
unsafe situation. 
PE 219 A factor when the individual uses procedures, which have been revised but 
not incorporated in the SMS, service bulletins by the maker not included in 
the SMS and document change requests are not submitted, lost or 
incorrectly filled, leading to an unsafe situation. 
PE 220 A factor when the individual uses the procedures, which do not meet the 
intent of the manufacturer’s procedures, non-standard steps or practices are 
added and the format does not match the rest of the procedure or 
procedures. 
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CREW CONDITION: Factors in a mishap if cognitive, psycho-behavioural, adverse 
physical state, or physical/mental limitations affect practices, conditions or actions of 
individuals and result in human error or an unsafe situation. PC xxx 
 
Cognitive factors (PC 100) – Factors in a mishap if cognitive or attention 
management conditions affect the perception or performance of individuals and result 
in human error or an unsafe situation. 
PC 101 A factor when the individual has a state of reduction conscious attention 
due to a sense of security, self-confidence, boredom or a perceived absence 
of threat from the environment which degrades crew performance. 
PC 102 A factor when the individual is focusing all conscious attention on a limited 
number of environmental cues to the exclusion of others of a subjectively 
equal or higher or more immediate priority, leading to an unsafe situation. 
PC 103 A factor when the individual is unable to maintain a cohesive and orderly 
awareness of events and required actions and experiences a state 
characterised by bewilderment, lack of clear thinking, or (sometimes) 
disorientation. 
PC 104 A factor when the individual has an interruption of attention and/or 
inappropriate redirection of attention by an environmental cue or mental 
process that degrades performance. 
PC 105 A factor when an individual is performing a highly automated/learned task 
and is distracted by another cue/event that results in the interruption and 
subsequent failure to complete the original task or results in skipping steps 
in the original task. 
PC 106 A factor when the individual is under the influence of a strong positive or 
negative emotion and that emotion interferes with duties. 
PC 107 A factor when the individual’s personal interaction with others creates an 
unsafe situation.  Examples are authoritarian, over-conservative, impulsive, 
invulnerable, and submissive or other personal traits that result in degraded 
crew performance. 
PC 108 A factor when the individual over-values or over-estimates personal 
capability, the capability of others or the capability of the machinery or 
equipment and this creates an unsafe situation. 
PC 109 A factor when the individual knowingly commits to a course of action that 
presses oneself and/or one’s equipment beyond reasonable limits. 
PC 110 A factor when the individual’s state of reduced conscious attention due to 
an attitude of overconfidence, undermotivation or the sense that others 
“have the situation under control” leads to an unsafe situation. 
PC 111 A factor when an individual or crew is excessive in the manner in which 
one conducts a mission. 
PC 112 A factor when the individual is preoccupied with success to the exclusion 
of other factors leading to an unsafe situation. 
PC 113 A factor when an individual or crew is motivated to complete a task for 
personal reasons, thereby short cutting necessary procedures or exercising 
poor judgement, leading to an unsafe situation. 
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PC 114 A factor when the individual has a cognitive or mental framework of 
expectations that predispose oneself to a certain course of action, regardless 
of other cues. 
PC 115 Also known as motivational exhaustion.  A factor when the individual has 
the type of exhaustion associated with the wearing effects of high 
operations and personal tempo where one’s operational requirements 
impinge on the ability to satisfy personal requirements and leads to 
degraded cognitive or operational capability. 
PC 116 A factor when the individual’s diminished mental capability is due to an 
inadequate recovery, as a result of restricted or shortened sleep or physical 
or mental activity during prolonged wakefulness.  Fatigue may additionally 
be described as acute, cumulative or chronic. 
PC 117 A factor when the individual’s normal, 24-hour rhythmic biological cycle 
(circadian rhythm) is disturbed and degrades task performance.  This is 
caused typically by night work or rapid movement (such as one time zone 
per hour) across several time zones. 
PC 118 A factor when an individual misperceives or misjudges weight, volume, 
pressure, temperature, viscosity, density, flow rate and sea conditions 
within the performance envelope or other operational conditions and this 
leads to an unsafe situation. 
PC 119 A factor when the individual is presented with a correct instrument reading 
but its significance is not recognised, it is misread or is misinterpreted. 
PC 120 A factor when the individual expects to perceive a certain reality and those 
expectations are strong enough to create a false perception of the 
expectation. 
PC 121 A factor when the auditory inputs are correctly interpreted but are 
misleading or disorienting or when the inputs are incorrectly interpreted 
and cause an impairment of normal performance. 
PC 122 A factor when the inputs other than auditory are correctly interpreted but 
are misleading or disorienting or when the inputs are incorrectly interpreted 
and cause an impairment of normal performance. 
PC 123 A factor when an individual exhibits lack of watchfulness and alertness 
leading to an unsafe situation. 
PC 124 A factor when the individual is unwilling to use written information 
because it is seen as lack of technical skills/knowledge or has lack of 
individual confidence.  In addition, this applies when the individuals do not 
question other’s processes or does not follow safe operating procedures 
because others do not follow them. 
PC 125 A factor when an individual was adequately exposed to the information 
needed to perform the task but did not absorb it.  Lack of knowledge in this 
case implies no deficiency in the training programme, but rather the failure 
of the individual to absorb or retain the information1. 
PC 126 A factor when the individual reverts to highly learned behaviour used in 
previous situation but response is inappropriate or degrades performance. 
                                                 
1 Exposure to information at a point in the past does not imply “knowledge” of it. 
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Physiological state (PC 200) – Factors in a mishap if the functioning of the body, 
including the physical and chemical process of cells, tissues, organs and systems and 
their various interaction is abnormal, resulting into a general or specific impairment, 
which leads to an individual making an error or leading to an unsafe act. 
PC 201 A factor when the individual takes a pharmaceutical intervention, 
prescribed or otherwise, that interferes with performance2.  The effects may 
be direct or residual. 
PC 202 A factor when due to an injury sustained during the job or a physical 
condition such as headaches and chronic pain, the senses and the ability to 
concentrate are affected and the time to react increases, resulting in a 
degradation of performance. 
PC 203 A factor when the individual suffers abnormal loss of awareness of the self 
and of one’s surroundings, resulting in an unsafe situation. 
PC 204 A factor when the individual’s diminished physical activity is due to 
overuse (time/relative load) during the job, degrading task performance3. 
PC 205 A factor when the symptoms of seasickness impair normal performance.  
Seasickness includes, nausea, sweating, flushing, headache, stomach 
awareness, malaise and vomiting. 
PC 206 A factor when the individual has insufficient oxygen supply to the body 
leading to an impairment of function. 
PC 207 A factor when the effect of ventilating above the physiological demands of 
the body causes the individual’s performance capabilities to be degraded. 
PC 208 A factor when the performance of the individual is degraded due to 
dehydration as a result of excessive fluid losses due to insufficient fluid 
intake. 
PC 209 A factor when the number or complexity of manual tasks in a compressed 
time period exceeds an individual’s capacity to perform. 
PC 210 A factor when the acute or residual effects of alcohol or drug overdose 
impair performance or create an unsafe situation. 
PC 211 A factor when the individual’s nutritional state or poor dietary practices are 
inadequate to fuel the brain and body functions resulting in degraded 
performance. 
PC 212 A factor when the opportunity to rest was provided but the individual failed 
to take the opportunity to rest. 
PC 213 A factor when the individual intentionally operates machinery or engages 
in maintenance tasks with a known disqualifying medical condition that 
results in an unsafe situation. 
 
                                                 
2 This includes nicotine or caffeine in sufficient quantities to cause impairment of normal function.  
This also includes chemical compound taken for purposes of prevention of disease, treatment of 
disease, weight management, mood alteration, birth control or sleep management etc. 
3 The effects of prolonged physical activity, or the effects of brief but relatively extreme physical 
activity, of which takes either an individual’s physical endurance or strength beyond the individual’s 
normal limits. 
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PC 214 A factor when the relative physical state of the individual, in terms of a 
regular rigorous exercise programme or a physical active lifestyle, is not 
adequate to support machinery space demands. 
PC 215 A factor when an individual replaces the primary goal of a task with a 
personal goal. 
PC 216 A factor when the individual’s motivation to accomplish a task is weak or 
indecisive. 
PC 217 A factor when a qualified crew member has physical problems either before 
joining the vessel or during his engagement on board but before the 
occurrence of the mishap. 
PC 218 A factor when the individual lacks the required psychomotor skills, 
coordination or timing skills necessary to accomplish the task attempted. 
PC 219 A factor when the individual is required to respond quickly but the reaction 
time available to process all the possibilities or choices thoroughly is 
critically short and exceeds one’s ability. 
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PERSONNEL FACTORS: Factors in a mishap if self-imposed stressors or crew 
resource management affect practices, conditions or actions of individuals and result 
in human error or an unsafe situation. PP xxx 
 
Crew interaction (PP 100) – Factors in a mishap if poor communication skills and 
team coordination affect the perception or performance of individuals and result in 
human error or an unsafe situation. 
PP 101 A factor when the machinery space leadership techniques failed to facilitate 
a proper crew climate, to include the establishment and the maintenance of 
an accurate and shared understanding of the evolving voyage and plan on 
the part of all crew members. 
PP 102 A factor when crew or team members failed to monitor, assist or back-up 
each other’s actions and decisions4. 
PP 103 A factor when the crew members failed to actively manage the distribution 
of mission tasks to prevent the overloading of any crew member. 
PP 104 A factor when the difference in rank of the machinery space staff or ship 
caused the crew performance capabilities to be degraded.  In addition, this 
applies to conditions where formal or informal authority gradient is too 
steep or too flat across a crew and this condition degrades collective or 
individual performance. 
PP 105 A factor when individuals failed to state critical information or solutions 
with appropriate persistence. 
PP 106 A factor when known critical information was not provided to appropriate 
individuals in an accurate or timely manner. 
PP 107 A factor when communications did not include supportive feedback or 
acknowledgement to ensure that crew members correctly understood 
announcements or directives. 
PP 108 A factor when an individual or crew member failed to complete all 
preparatory tasks associated with planning the job, resulting in an unsafe 
situation.  Planning the job includes information collection and analysis, 
coordinating activities within the crew and with appropriate external 
agencies, contingency planning, and risk assessment. 
PP 109 A factor when information and instructions provided to individuals, crews, 
or teams were insufficient, or participants failed to discuss maintenance 
jobs and strategies to cope with contingencies. 
PP 110 A factor when crew members fail to adequately reassess changes in their 
dynamic environment during job execution and change their task plans 
accordingly to ensure adequate management of risk. 
PP 111 A factor when correctly communicated information is misunderstood, 
misinterpreted, or disregarded. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Factor ‘PP102’ captures situations where ‘team stability’ collapses in the face of an emergency 
leading to chaos. 
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Personal readiness (PP 200) – Factors in a mishap if the crew member demonstrates 
disregard for rules and instructions that govern the individuals readiness to perform, 
or exhibits poor judgement when it comes to readiness and results in human error or 
an unsafe situation.  This does not only include personal readiness failures because 
rules or regulations have been broken. 
PP 201 A factor when inadequate familiarisation training leads to human error or 
an unsafe situation. 
PP 202 A factor when job is performed by individual for the first time or job is 
performed in the wrong sequence. 
PP 203 A factor when frequent work interruptions, failure to perform preparation 
tasks first, too many tasks are scheduled for limited time period or task 
necessary for safety is not performed first, leading to a human error or an 
unsafe act. 
PP 204 A factor when the risk-evolution exercise neither offers an advise on each 
of the identified hazards nor does it give a comprehensive judgement on 
whether the entire system is safe enough. 
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UNSAFE SUPERVISION 
 
Supervision: Factors in a mishap if the methods, decisions or policies of the 
supervisory chain of command (officers at management level over operational and 
support levels) directly affect practices, conditions, or actions of individual and result 
in human error or an unsafe situation. 
 
INADEQUATE SUPERVISION: Factors in a mishap when supervision proves 
inappropriate or improper and fails to identify hazard, recognize and control risk, 
provide guidance, training and/or oversight and results in human error or an unsafe 
situation. SI xxx 
 
Shipborne and shore supervision (SI 000) – Factors in a mishap when the interaction 
between officers at management level and the ship’s ISM managers has a direct 
bearing on the day-to-day running and operation of the machinery space, leading to an 
unsafe situation. 
SI 001 A factor when the availability, competency, quality, or timeliness of 
leadership, supervision or oversight does not meet task demands and 
creates an unsafe situation.  Inappropriate supervisory pressures are also 
captured under this code5. 
SI 002 A factor when the individual’s learning is influenced by the behaviour of 
peers and supervisors and when the learning manifests itself in actions that 
are either inappropriate to the individual’s skill level or violate standard 
procedures and lead to an unsafe situation. 
SI 003 A factor when one-time or recurrent training programmes, upgrade 
programmes, transition programmes or any other local training is 
inadequate or unavailable (etc) and this creates an unsafe situation6. 
SI 004 A factor when policy, guidance, or lack of a policy on guidance leads to an 
unsafe situation. 
SI 005 A factor when crew members at management, operational and/or support 
levels experience a “personality conflict” that leads to a dangerous error in 
judgement/action. 
SI 006 A factor when information critical to a potential safety issue had been 
provided to officers at management level without feedback to the source 
(e.g. DPA) i.e. failure to close the loop. 
SI 007 A factor when current technical information related to the running of the 
machinery space or maintenance of machinery in the machinery space is 
not provided to other crew members at management level and/or at 
operational and support level leading to a dangerous error in 
judgement/decision. 
 
                                                 
5 Factor ‘SI 001’ also captures lack of records on crew performance data. 
6 The failure of an individual to absorb the training material in an adequate training programme does 
not indicate a training programme problem.  Capture these factors under ‘PC 125’.  The failure of an 
individual to recall learned information under stress or while fatigued despite attending an adequate 
training programme does not indicate a training programme problem.  Capture these factors under 
‘PC 103’, ‘PC 104’ and ‘PC 126’. 
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SI 008 A factor when officers at management level do not distribute breaks 
throughout work periods, particularly when things are routine, repetitive, 
long and/or monotonous. 
SI 009 A factor when officers at management level do not make sure that crew 
members at operation and support level successfully fulfil their assigned 
responsibility. 
SI 010 A factor when the officers in management level are not assigned the 
necessary resources to accomplish goals and objectives. 
SI 011 A factor when officers at management level do not track a crew member’s 
qualifications, resulting in that individual serving in a particular capacity or 
perform a particular function or task which is higher than that specified in 
his document7. 
SI 012 A factor when realistic, understandable, measurable, and achievable 
objectives are not set, leading to unclear and misunderstood objectives. 
SI 013 A factor when the officer at management level is either untrained or else 
the situation demands exceed his ability to oversee the task performed by 
the other officers. 
SI 014 A factor when for some reason other than lack of training and/or situation 
demands, an officer at management level does not oversee the task 
performed by other officers. 
SI 015 A factor when officers at management level do not communicate safety 
critical information to the company representatives, leading to an unsafe 
situation or a situation not tackled in an adequate manner8. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 An individual signing on a vessel without the necessary documents that the STCW Convention 
requires as evidence of having met (or achieved) all relevant Convention requirements, is also 
captured under ‘SI 011’. 
8 Company representatives refer to safety managers, superintendents and/or the DPA. 
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PLANNED INAPPROPRIATE OPERATIONS: Factors in a mishap when supervision 
fails to adequately assess the hazards associated with an operation and allows for 
unnecessary risk.  It is also a factor when supervision allows non-proficient or 
inexperienced personnel to attempt tasks beyond their capability or when crew 
complement is inappropriate for the task. SP xxx 
 
Shipborne operations (SP 000) – Factors in a mishap when the interaction between 
officers at management and operational levels and support levels has a direct bearing 
on the day-to-day running and operation of the machinery space, leading to an unsafe 
situation. 
SP 001 A factor when an officer at management level directs crew members to 
undertake a task beyond their skill level or beyond the capabilities of their 
equipment. 
SP 002 A factor when the interaction of senior officers at management level and 
junior crew members at operation and support levels leads to poor 
communication and coordination problems. 
SP 003 A factor when the officer at management level selects an individual who’s 
experience for either a specific task, event or scenario is not sufficiently 
current to permit safe task execution. 
SP 004 A factor when an officer at management level selects an individual who has 
either infrequently or rarely performed a task, or participated in a specific 
scenario. 
SP 005 A factor when an individual is not proficient in a task or event. 
SP 006 A factor when an officer at management level does not adequately evaluate 
the risks associated with a task or when pre-task risk assessment tools or 
risk assessment programmes are inadequate. 
SP 007 A factor when management level authorises a task or a task element that is 
unnecessarily hazardous without sufficient cause or need.  In addition, it 
includes unintentional scheduling of crew members for a task that they are 
not qualified to perform. 
SP 008 A factor when due to the prevailing circumstances, offices at management 
level do not brief and/or supervise the subordinates. 
SP 009 A factor when due to the prevailing circumstances management does not 
provide an opportunity for crew rest9. 
SP 010 A factor when due to the prevailing circumstances management authorises 
tasks and workload in excess of the capability of the individual. 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Factor ‘SP 009’ captures instances during emergency operations, as compared to rest periods captures under ‘SI 
008’. 
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FAILED TO CORRECT KNOWN PROBLEMS: Factors in a mishap when officers at 
management level fail to correct known deficiencies in documents, processes or 
procedures, or fail to correct inappropriate or unsafe actions of individuals, and this 
lack of supervisory action creates an unsafe situation. SF xxx 
 
Shipborne shortcomings (SF 000) – Factors in a mishap when officers at management 
level do not comply with safety management practices, leading to an unsafe situation. 
SF 001 A factor when officers at management level fail to identify a crew member 
at operation or support level who exhibits recognisable risky behaviour or 
unsafe tendencies or fail to institute remedial actions when an individual is 
identified with risky behaviours or unsafe tendencies. 
SF 002 A factor when officers at management level fail to correct a safety hazard 
or factors which might trigger off an accident. 
SF 003 A factor when, following a safety analysis, decisions on corrective actions 
are not implemented. 
SF 004 A factor when officers at management level fail to correct known 
hazardous practices, conditions or guidance that allow for hazardous 
practices within the scope of one’s command. 
SF 005 A factor when revised procedures have not been incorporated in the SMS, 
service bulletins by the maker not included in the SMS and document 
change made by the company are lost or incorrectly filed, leading to an 
unsafe situation. 
SF 006 A factor when due to lack of management level oversight in the stock 
taking of spare parts or tools, hand marked labelling is incorrect or a wrong 
part number on the part leads to the selection of the incorrect part. 
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SUPERVISORY VIOLATIONS: Factors in a mishap when officers at management 
level wilfully disregards instructions, guidance, rules, or operating instructions whilst 
managing organisational assets and this lack of supervisory responsibly creates an 
unsafe situation. SV xxx 
 
Shipborne violations (SV 000) – Factors in a mishap when violations committed by 
the operating and support level machinery space crew members are tolerated by 
officers at management level, leading to an unsafe situation. 
SV 001 A factor when a master inappropriately signs-on an individual on board his 
ship even though he is aware that the individual does not possess the 
necessary documents or has not met the necessary qualifications prescribed 
in the STCW Convention or the national requirements of the flag State of 
the ship. 
SV 002 A factor when organisational and operating rules have not been enforced by 
the normally constituted authority. 
SV 003 A factor when an officer at management level directs an officer at operation 
level and/or a crew member at support level to infringe existing regulations, 
instructions or technical guidance. 
SV 004 A factor when an officer at management level directs another crew member 
to carry out a task, which does not necessarily violate a written procedure 
but nonetheless goes against established seamanship practices. 
SV 005 A factor when rather than following formally established and constituted 
authority, an individual at management level follows unwritten and 
unofficial policy, which leads to an unsafe situation or else wilfully 
encourages disregard of authority in his subordinates10. 
SV 006 A factor when officers at management level allows for the use of 
inadequate/obsolete instructions or technical guidance. 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Factor ‘SV 005’ is very closely related to factors captured under ‘OC 004’.  Nonetheless, raters need 
to distinguish between an officer following an unwritten instruction or an unofficial policy and an 
officer exerting overriding authority, emanating from a resilient organisational system. 
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ORGANISATIONAL INFLUENCES 
 
Organisation: Factors in a mishap if the communications, actions omissions or 
policies of upper-level management directly or indirectly affect supervisory practices, 
conditions or actions of the crew member(s) and result in system failure, human error 
or an unsafe situation. 
 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: Factors in a mishap if resource management (and/or 
acquisition) processes or policies, directly or indirectly, influence system safety and 
results in poor error management or creates an unsafe situation. OR xxx 
 
Human resources (OR 000) - Factors in a mishap when organisational decision-
making regarding the allocation and maintenance of human resources results in 
human error or an unsafe situation. 
OR 001 A factor when the process of safe manning or manning resource allocations 
is inadequate for the voyage demands and the inadequacy causes an unsafe 
situation or excessive stress on the remaining crew members. 
OR 002 A factor when the process of engaging crew members, either directly or 
through a manning agency, is inadequate for the voyage and/or company 
demands and the inadequacy cause an unsafe situation11. 
OR 003 A factor when the process allows for the assigning of responsibility to a 
crew member without the requisite training, resulting in an unsafe 
situation12. 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Factor ‘OR 001’ also captures situations where the engaging of multi-national crew members on 
board a ship leads to the erection of language barriers, causing an unsafe situation. 
12 Training captured under factor ‘OR 003’ has two components.  The first component is the initial 
training given to a crew member when he signs on a vessel i.e. the familiarisation training as required 
by the ISM Code.  The second component is the in-house training or other on-going training, such as 
refresher courses, which is intended to keep the crew members abreast and fresh with the necessary 
knowledge to operate in a safe manner on board the ship. 
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Technological environment (OR 100) - Factors in a mishap when organisational 
decision-making regarding the allocation and maintenance of monetary assets results 
in human error or an unsafe situation. 
OR 101 A factor when excessive cost-cutting results in reduced funding for new 
equipment, the purchase of low-cost, lack of quality replacement parts 
and/or bunker oil. 
OR 102 A factor when the vessel does not receive indirect financial resources to 
complete a task and/or allocation of training programmes is cut short and 
this deficiency creates an unsafe situation. 
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Equipment/facility resources (OR 200) - Factors in a mishap when organisational 
decision-making and policies regarding the selection of particular designs, resources 
and facilities result in human error or an unsafe situation. 
OR 201 A factor when support facilities and opportunities for recreation/rest are not 
available or adequate and this creates an unsafe situation13. 
OR 202 A factor when the processes through which the vessel, equipment, 
machinery or logistical support are acquired allow inadequacies or when 
design deficiencies allow inadequacies in the acquisition and the 
inadequacies create an unsafe situation. 
OR 203 A factor when the process through which equipment is removed from 
service is inadequate and this inadequacy creates an unsafe situation. 
OR 204 A factor when the process through which crew members and shore 
personnel are screened, brought into the service, or placed into specialties, 
is inadequate and creates an unsafe situation. 
OR 205 A factor when the design of the machinery space contributes directly to 
either the initiation and/or propagation of an unsafe situation or else it does 
not assist the crew member’s cognitive activities during the interception 
and interpretation of the overall system cues and creates an unsafe 
situation. 
OR 206 A factor when the design of a particular piece of machinery, control or 
equipment contributes directly to the initiation and/or propagation of an 
unsafe situation or else visual and/or aurally information provided to the 
crew member is not presented clearly and properly and creates an unsafe 
situation. 
OR 207 A factor when equipment is bought even if it does not meet internationally 
agreed specifications. 
OR 208 A factor when design flaws which have been discovered in similar 
equipment through assessments or investigations have not been corrected, 
leading to an unsafe situation14. 
OR 209 A factor when tools either have not been made available on board or tools 
made available are of poor design, awkward to use or pose difficulties to 
the crew member, leading to an unsafe situation. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Factor ‘OR 201’ captures situations where leave from the vessel (signing off) is refused for reasons 
other than the individual’s choice.  Support facilities include dining, exercise, mess rooms, medical 
care etc. 
14 Factor ‘OR 208’ captures also design flaws, which have been discovered in other companies and 
made public through accident and incident reports. 
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ORGANISATIONAL PROCESS: Factors in a mishap if organisational processes such 
as operations, procedures, operational risk management and oversight, negatively 
influence individual, supervisory, and/or organisational performance and results in 
unrecognised hazards and/or uncontrolled risk and leads to human error or an unsafe 
situation. OP xxx 
 
Operations (OP 000) - Factors in a mishap when corporate decisions and rules that 
govern the day-to-day activities within an organisation create an unsafe situation. 
OP 001 A factor when the management company determines that it is necessary to 
increase the operational tempo to a point that it overextends the machinery 
space manning capabilities, leading to a human error or an unsafe situation. 
OP 002 A factor when the management company discontinues or inhibits incentive 
(award) programmes, leading to under-reporting of hazards, incidents and 
lack of active participation in safety meetings. 
OP 003 A factor when the management company allows for environmental 
demands to exceed the available resources, leading to stress (physiological, 
psychological, behavioural or social outcomes). 
OP 004 A factor when the officers at management level have to resort to inadequate 
scheduling procedures that jeopardise crew rest or produce sub-optimal 
crew interaction, putting crew members at an increased risk of a mishap. 
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Procedures (OP 100) - Factors in a mishap when corporate decisions and rules that 
govern the day-to-day use of standard operating procedures create an unsafe situation. 
OP 101 A factor when written procedures are found to be flawed or faulty, leading 
to the application of non-standard procedures, resulting in the introduction 
of unwanted variability into the maintenance operations. 
OP 102 A factor when the management company fails to establish or communicate 
the objectives for goals or the objectives are unrealistic, not understandable, 
immeasurable and unachievable, leading to misunderstanding by the crew 
members. 
OP 103 A factor when written direction, checklists, graphic depictions, tables, 
charts or other published guidance are inadequate, misleading or 
inappropriate and this creates an unsafe situation. 
OP 104 A factor when weather, intelligence, operational planning material or other 
information necessary for safe operations planning are not available, 
leading to human error or an unsafe situation. 
 
 
 
Version 1.5 
06/05/2007 
xxxiv The Concept of Performance Variability: 
Investigating Fires & Explosions in Ships’ Machinery Spaces 
 
Oversight (OP 200) - Factors in a mishap when corporate decisions and rules that 
govern the use of formal methods for maintaining oversight between the crew 
members and company management create an unsafe situation. 
OP 201 A factor when the doctrine, philosophy or concept of operations in an 
organisation is either flawed or accepts unnecessary risk and this flaw or 
risk acceptance leads to an unsafe situation or uncontrolled hazard. 
OP 202 A factor when the company either does not have a safety/risk programme in 
place as it is seen as an overhead and a non-productive value or has a 
safety/risk programme without having an adequate understanding of the 
problem or actions needed to resolve safety critical issues15. 
OP 203 A factor when companies are missing official procedures in place to 
address contingencies and oversight programmes to monitor risks, leading 
to unawareness of problems before an accident occurs. 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Factor ‘OP 202’ also captures instances such as when the company orders a generic safety 
management system manual and puts it on the shelf and/or when the management company blames a 
crew member whenever an accident/incident happens on board the ship. 
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ORGANISATIONAL CLIMATE: Factors in a mishap if organisational variables 
including environment, structure, policies, and culture influence individual actions are 
inadequate and result in human error or an unsafe situation. OC xxx 
 
Structure (OC 000) - Factors in a mishap when the overall hierarchal structure of a 
company creates an unsafe situation. 
OC 001 A factor when the chain-of-command on board a ship or the management 
structure of the managing company is confusing, non-standard or 
inadequate and this creates an unsafe situation. 
OC 002 A factor when a breakdown in the transfer of information between the 
managing company to the ship or between crew members results in correct 
information not reaching the crew member in a timely manner, leading to a 
human error or an unsafe situation. 
OC 003 A factor when the representatives16 of a managing company either is unable 
to take the opportunity or else the opportunity does not exist to listen and 
respond to crew members’ questions and comments, leading to an unsafe 
situation. 
OC 004 A factor when the managing company undermines the authority and 
interferes with the accountability of officers at management level, 
preventing them from effectively carrying out their assigned 
responsibilities, leading to an unsafe situation17. 
OC 005 A factor when the organisational structure does not include a specific 
accountability system, whereby managers and officers in management level 
are held accountable for the completion of assigned safety responsibilities 
resulting in substandard performance and an unsafe situation. 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Company representatives refer to safety managers, superintendents and/or designated persons ashore. 
17 Factor ‘OC 004’ captures situations when the managing company fails to realise that company 
procedures do not necessarily capture all situations and therefore under the prevailing situation, the 
crew members at management level need to be allowed a certain degree of authority to override 
established procedures in the interest of safety and pollution prevention. 
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Policies (OC 100) - Factors in a mishap when ill-defined, adversarial, or conflicting 
policies or supplanted by unofficial rules and values result in confusion and lead to 
human error or an unsafe situation. 
OC 101 A factor when a crew member perceives that his/her performance on a task 
will inappropriately influence an evaluation, promotion or opportunity for 
upgrade and this pressure creates an unsafe situation. 
OC 102 A factor when company policy on human resources issues does not indicate 
company’s commitment to safety. 
OC 103 A factor when company policy related to drugs and alcohol on board ships 
is not communicated and/or enforced on board, making it difficult for the 
crew member to choose the correct actions, resulting in human error or an 
unsafe situation. 
OC 104 A factor when the company does not investigate accidents/incidents 
internally or else fails to appreciate that accident/incident investigation can 
be the starting point of a safety analysis, resulting in lack of understanding 
of the risk of the vessel, leading to an unsafe situation18. 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Factor ‘OC 104’ captures investigations conducting by managing companies with the purpose to 
apportion blame.  Situations where notwithstanding the company’s awareness of similar accidents, 
safety information is not passed to the fleet, are captured under factor ‘OR 208’. 
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Culture (OC 200) - Factors in a mishap when the unofficial or unspoken rules, values, 
attitudes, beliefs, and customs of a company contribute to human error or unsafe 
situation. 
OC 201 A factor when the expression of personal and organisational values 
demonstrates improper actions and are endorsed by the managing company.
OC 202 A factor when the managing company does not understand the underlying 
beliefs and/or philosophies of crew members resulting in inadequacies in 
the development of the safety management system. 
OC 203 A factor when safety is considered to be a priority rather than a core value 
and operational principle, resulting in safety becoming redundant to other 
matters when priorities shift as a result of environmental demands. 
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STATUTORY: Factors in a mishap if the regulator’s regime is either sub-standard or 
lacks the necessary depth, leading to an unsafe situation. FS xxx 
 
International/national standards (FS 000) - Factors in a mishap when the process of 
setting international standards or part thereof contributes to human error or an unsafe 
situation. 
FS 001 A factor when the rule-making process fails to anticipate potential risks 
involved, resulting in a loop-hole/weakness in international regulations. 
FS 002 A factor when regulations do not keep pace with technological changes, 
leading to an unsafe situation. 
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Flag state implementation (FS 100) - Factors in a mishap when the process of 
enforcement of regulations at national level is sub-standard and this situation 
contributes to an unsafe situation. 
FS 101 A factor when due to several constraints, the flag State Administration is 
unable to provide adequate oversight to a ship and its managers. 
FS 102 A factor when the flag State Administration, which has delegated its 
authority to an RO, is not able to satisfy its responsibility by, inter alia, 
monitoring the performance of the RO’s activity on its behalf. 
FS 103 A factor when a class or statutory survey fails to capture a deficiency in the 
system leading to an unsafe situation. 
FS 104 A factor when safety information (including safety lessons from accident 
reports) or other pertinent literature emanating from the IMO, NGOs or 
consultative bodies is not communicated to the ship owner, manager or 
master of the vessel, leading to inadequate dissemination of safety 
information19. 
 
                                                 
19 The inadequate dissemination must be a contributing factor to an accident. 
